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iABSTRACT
The law of England and Wales provides that an adult with capacity has the right to refuse 
medical treatment both contemporaneously and in an advance refusal. Legislation separates 
general advance refusalsof treatment from advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment. The 
law, outlined in ss.24 to 26 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, is stricter for creation of the latter. 
These sections brought with them a new age of interests by purporting to elevate individual 
autonomy as the primary concern. Beginning with the classical tale of Odysseus and a general 
discussion of the value to be found in a law seeking to preserve individual autonomy, this thesis 
seeks to act as a critique of the current enactment in practice.
The provisions are already under-used and under-applied; without change, they may 
never reach the stage where they are ethically and practically viable. It is argued that the 
advance refusals provisions are not taking full effect due to a combination of lacking moral 
grounding and general dismissal of key ethical dilemmas at the forefront of
application. Building on this, the moral basis for this thesis is found in Alan Gewirth’s Principle 
of Generic Consistency (PGC) which links directly with the general application of human rights. 
The PGC becomes a compass for determining how best to treat persons when addressing the 
three most prominent challenges faced by the Act which are: the debate between the 
conferred right of autonomy versus the right to life; the issue of personhood; and, the personal 
identity problem. Ultimately, unless framework provisions are strengthened, and the MCA 2005 
is rethought in light of prominent ethical, legal and social considerations, the constraints of the 
Act on paper will continue to suppress the important underlying values promulgating individual 
autonomy.
ii
TABLE OF LEGISLATION
Primary
Human Rights Act 1998
Mental Capacity Act 2005
Mental Health Act 1983
Mental Health Act 2007
Suicide Act 1961 
Bills
Assisted Dying Bill 2013-14
The Assisted Decision-making (Capacity) Bill 2013
International Instruments
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  (ECHR) 1957
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948
UNESCO‘s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1997
iii
TABLE OF CASES
A (Mental Patient: Sterilisation), Re [2000] F.L.R. 549; [2000] 1 F.C.R. 193 CA (Civ Div).
A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation), Re [2001] Fam 147.
A Local Authority v E; [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP). 
A Local Authority v K (by the Official Solicitor) Mrs K and Mr K A NHS Trust [2013] EWHC 242 
;(COP) 2013 WL 552275.
Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James on appeal from: [2013] EWCA Civ 
65SC; [2013] UKSC 67; 2013 WL 5730338.
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789.
AK (Adult Patient) (Medical Treatment: Consent), Re [2001] 1 F.L.R. 129.
B (Wardship: Medical Treatment), Re [1990] 3 All E.R. 927.
B (Adult: Refusal of Medical treatment), Re [2002] EWHC 429.
HE v Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam).
Jerry Strunk v Ava Strunk, Committee for Jerry  Strunk, Incompetent et al, appellees, sub.nom 
Strunk v Strunk (1969)Court of Appeals Kentucky.
M (Adult Patient) (Minimally Conscious State: Withdrawal of Treatment), Re [2011] EWHC 1197 
(Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287 (2011).
MB (Caesarean section), Re [1997]; sub nom. MB (Medical Treatment), Re [1997] 2 FLR 426; 
[1997]2 F.C.R. 541 CA (Civ Div). 
Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 304 (QB); [2012] H.R.L.R. 16.
NHS Trust v L; EWHC 2741 (COP) (2012).
Pretty v UK (No. 2346/02) (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1.
iv
R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61.
R. (on the application of Purdy) v DPP [2008] EWHC 2565; [2009] EWCA Civ 92;[2009] UKHL.
R. (N and Another)[2009] HRLR 31.
R. (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 466 (Civ Div).
R. (on the application of Jane Nicklinson) and Lamb v Ministry of Justice; R (on the application of 
AM) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] EWCA Civ 961.
R. (on the application of Tony Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381 (Admin), 2012 
WL 3491755.
T (Adult: refusal of medical treatment), Re [1993], Fam. 95.
The X Primary Care Trust v XB, (By the Official Solicitor as Litigation Friend) [2012] EWHC 1390 
(Fam); (2012) 127 B.M.L.R. 122; [2012] W.T.L.R. 1621.
Whitbread Ex parte in the Matter of Hinde, a Lunatic (1816) 2 Meriv 99; 35 E.R. 878.
Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation), Re [1997] Fam. 110; [1997] 2 W.L.R. 556.
vSTATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published 
without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many thanks are due to my soon-to-be husband, my rock, Andrew Gibbison, and the same to 
Chris Gibbison, his father, for looking after me so well when I have been writing this and 
finishing my Legal Practice Course simultaneously. 
With thanks to Professor Deryck Beyleveld for providing generous scholarship for this, and for 
helping me to realise my passion has always been, and always will be, the law. To my supervisor 
Professor Shaun Pattinson whose intellect, guidance and patience have never ceased to amaze 
me over the last eight years, I am forever indebted to you for being an inspiration.
1CHAPTER ONE: ETHICS, ODYSSEUS AND THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005
1.1 Introduction
The law of England and Wales1 provides that a competent adult with capacity has the right to 
refuse medical treatment both contemporaneously2 and in an advance refusal.3 General 
advance refusals regarding treatment (herein general advance refusals) are separated from 
advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment (herein advance refusals). Governed by ss.24 to 26 
of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (herein ‘MCA 2005’ or ‘the 2005 Act’), the law is stricter for 
creation of the latter. These sections brought with them a new age of interests by purporting to 
elevate individual autonomy as the primary concern.  
It is important here to draw the seminal distinction between competence and legally 
recognised capacity. For the purposes of definition, an adult4 is found to be ‘competent’ when 
their cognitive abilities are at a level where they can make a voluntary decision in a certain 
situation – on the contrary, they are deemed ‘incompetent’ where they cannot make such 
decisions. Building on this, Shaun Pattinson’s ‘task-specific’ competence5 is the main definition 
of competence used in this piece.  Defining competence in this way helps build on the notion of 
autonomy especially when looking at the decision-making abilities of those with dementia 
because of the ‘sliding scale’ of ability experienced. It makes sense to assess competence 
subjectively, by reference to an individual’s ability to perform or partake in certain activities 
1 In both Scotland and Northern Ireland, the situation regarding advance refusals is regulated by 
common law only. In Scotland, there is no law defining a document or registering body for advance 
decisions of any form. For further information on the proposed system in Ireland please see The Assisted 
Decision-making (Capacity) Bill 2013 and for discussion over provisional implementation see Morrissey 
2013, 69. 
2 The principle that contemporaneous treatment may be refused by an adult with capacity is dealt with 
only at common law see for e.g. Re T [1993] Fam. 95. 
3MCA 2005 s.1 to 4 and ss.24 to 26. 
4 MCA 2005 s.24 (1) an ‘adult’ is defined as over 18 for advance refusals but an ‘adult’ is also classed as 
those over 16 (s.2 (5)(b)) generally for application of the other principles in the Act.
5 See Pattinson 2002a, 78 and Pattinson 2011, 148 and 150.
2because the distinction between having competence to read a book and having competence to 
make future decisions about healthcare treatment are very different. It is disturbing that there 
are currently no specific provisions within the 2005 Act to this effect.6
Capacity and competence are two separate states – a person may be deemed 
competent at one level, but this may not lead to a legally recognisable level of competence 
entailing legal capacity. Michael Gunn summarises this point:
“Capacity/incapacity are not concepts with clear a priori boundaries… The challenge is 
to choose the right level to set as the gateway to decision-making and respect for 
persons and autonomy”.7
Thus the gateway to decision-making is set as follows: a legally recognised level of decision-
making capacity is achieved when a person satisfies the two stage test laid down ss.2 to 3 of the 
MCA 2005. The opposite applies where a person does not have capacity. For the first part of the 
test, capacity is presumed; a patient will only lack capacity if they are unable to make decisions 
for themselves ‘because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or 
brain’ and includes temporary damage to cognitive abilities (s.2(2)). The second part per s.3(1) 
of the MCA 2005 declares that a patient will be classed as unable to make a decision, if they are 
unable to:
i) Understand information relevant to the decision;
ii) Retain  that information;
iii) Use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision ; or
iv) Communicate the decision by any means.
6 Whilst it is understood that even in periods of lucidity in capacity, a person cannot necessarily be 
viewed as not having capacity, there is no exception for dementia patients where competence may still 
be established, but legally recognised capacity is not. Dementia is described as being ‘a disturbance in 
the functioning of the mind or the brain’, see further Disability Law Service (2009) guidance on Mental 
Capacity, 3. 
http://www.dls.org.uk/advice/factsheet/community_care/mental_capacity/Mental_Capacity.pdf
<accessed 20/12/13>. 
7Gunn 1994, 8.
31.2 The Relevance of Odysseus
The MCA 2005 purports to champion the autonomous decision of a once capacitated person 
over their future incapacitated person – this principle applies only to refusals of healthcare, not 
requests.8 Where a person makes a contemporaneous refusal of medical treatment, the 
assertion of legal capacity is more easily provable than its advance counterpart. 
The title to this thesis relates to the first ever documentation of an advance refusal 
presented in a fictional account through the character of Odysseus in Homer’s9 ‘The Odyssey’.10
Odysseus is warned by Circe that during his travels, his return journey will involve an encounter 
with the ‘Sirens’, ethereal singing entities which lure men to their deaths.  With this knowledge, 
Odysseus plugs his men’s ears with beeswax and has them bind him to the mast of the ship. He 
issues an advance directive that they are not, in any event, to untie him as he will beg of them. 
Instead, he urges them to pull the bindings tighter – so he can still witness the Sirens and hear 
their song, but at the same time, avoid their mortiferous effect. Because of the knowledge he 
gained from Circe, Odysseus anticipated two things as a consequence of his meeting with the 
deadly enticers:
1) That the situation he engineered would entail him begging to be released by his 
shipmen which would result in his own death; and
2) That he would return to his usual level of consciousness afterwards.
These anticipations became true. This type of advance refusal in itself is presented as being 
straightforward – both at the time of making the advance refusal and afterwards, Odysseus 
remained competent. From this, on an ethical level, there could be no case for deviation from 
his wishes. In reality, the situation is far more complex. Comparatively, Odysseus’ desire was to 
prolong his life by not being lured by the Sirens, yet the MCA 2005 only allows for the rejection 
8 At this juncture it is of note that this thesis focuses only on rights in relation to advance refusals, not 
advance requests. As stated, this is also the position at law.
9 The Greeks believed the story was created by Homer; in modern day, he is always mentioned as the 
author but this can never be proven. 
10 See Homer BCE, as translated in Rieu and Rieu 2003, 158-159 and 161-162 and Pattinson 2011, 531-
532.
4of treatment which can shorten life.  Far from the situation of Odysseus, conceptually advance 
refusals at law in the modern day present as being both ethically and legislatively problematic. 
Odysseus’ account relates directly with the central purpose of this thesis: to investigate 
whether or not the current law of advance refusals adequately addresses preservation of the 
wishes, values, views and beliefs of persons through the main provisions. Building upon 
Homer’s account of an advance refusal, three inter-connected central areas of concern are 
explored within this thesis; the ongoing debate at law between autonomy and the preservation 
of life, and the problems faced specifically by the MCA 2005 regarding the ethical issues around 
personhood and personal identity. 
1.3 Objectives
The general approach of this piece is that the spirit of the law around advance refusals, 
respecting the autonomy of the individual, is propitious, but that further developments both in 
the legislation on paper, and within the law in practice, must be made to adequately fill lacunae 
which still exist. The recurrent fundamental theme throughout this piece is that without 
attempting to fill such lacunae, the 2005 Act is precluded from preserving the wishes, values, 
views and beliefs of persons (which was a theme at least to an extent, intended by the Act). 
Applying the main provisions in real terms has caused a significant departure of the law 
from reality. As a result, high levels of confusion are bred, affecting those making advance 
refusals,11 through to the decision makers in the Court of Protection.12 Henry Small recently 
emphasised the importance of clarity in this area:
“Nowhere is the requirement for legal certainty more important than where personal 
autonomy and human dignity are concerned”.13
11 To see the extent of difficulty encountered for creators of advance refusals see for e.g. Craigie 2013, 
4-19.
12 A Local Authority v E; [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) at 129 ; here, Jackson J. described reaching a decision 
as being ‘intuitive’ as opposed to ‘mechanistic’ in granting an anorexic palliative care as opposed to 
rehabilitative, lifesaving treatment.
13 Small, H. 2014.
5Existing problems need to be rectified by way of unity between the spirit of the 2005 Act 
and the advance refusal provisions. Examples causing this current ‘non-unity’ include:
1) The historical dominance of the Article 2 (European Convention on Human Rights
; herein ‘ECHR’) ‘right to life’ over the right to autonomy (loosely defined as an 
individual’s free ability to make decisions for the purposes they choose; this right is 
codified in art.8 right to respect for private and family life). Where the 2005 Act 
purports to grant advance decisions to those who fulfil the strict criteria laid down , it  
must also consider widening its ambit so as not to exclude the permissibility of such 
advance refusals based upon small issues.14 Classically, the right to life has always 
‘trumped’ any other right when such cases have been heard in court – if the 2005 Act is 
really going to do what it set out to do, such long-standing commitment to this right 
must be weighed more evenly against its counterpart right to autonomy.
2) The lack of guidance for the treatment of those who suffer from dementia and 
advance refusals.  If a person is no longer exhibiting the same behaviours and there is a 
question around their identity, as seen with those suffering late stage dementia, there 
must be a degree of consensus for understanding how best to treat such persons with 
severe personality changes. A person can have dementia, but can still be classed as ‘the 
same person’. There must be some further guidance in this matter other than the 
General Medical Council’s (herein ‘GMC’) requirement that such persons require ‘extra 
support’15 during the decision-making process. Where the MCA 2005 treats all persons 
as if they do not have capacity if there is a question as to their personal identity (early-
mid stage dementia) it is here contended that where such individuals have a level of 
task-specific competence this should be used as the starting point, not the legal test for 
capacity which is set at an unreachably high level. If relevant competence is established, 
and until the personal identity problem is proven to be a problem, an advance refusal 
should not be automatically excluded from applying today.
14 This was the case in The X Primary Care Trust v XB [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam); this point is fully explored 
at 4.2.1 and 4.3.
15GMC 2008, para 67. 
63) The current standards used for judging what is in the ‘best interests’ of persons 
when there has been no advance refusal created, or where that advance refusal is 
‘ambiguous’ is not consistent with the moral basis for this thesis. It is urged that new 
systems of deeming what is best should be made after consideration of all of the above 
issues. The current ‘catch-all’ test does not in fact produce the best results as each 
patient is a person, and each person is different. 
It is argued that these various issues present themselves as significant flaws which should have 
been digested in the under-belly of the MCA during the draft stages of the 2005 Act; as 
problems prevail, legislative overhaul is needed. Such legislative harmony could be achieved 
through a codified injection of moral grounding. 
1.4 Chapter Outline
The last part of this introductory chapter is a brief overview of the moral basis for this thesis 
which is the suggested model to be used in improving efficacy of the main provisions. This 
introduction aims to set the scene for chapter two’s promulgation of the message that advance 
refusals have an important role to play in protecting autonomy despite appreciation that their 
effect is often denied in practice. 
Later in the second chapter, I argue that the 2005 Act’s codification of the right to refuse 
life-sustaining treatment in particular has not produced the desired effect. This, it is argued, is 
due to flaws in implementation. This conclusion is reached by exploring the notion that the 
MCA 2005 has exacerbated many of the problems which were, and still remain, unresolved at 
common law.
In keeping with the moral basis for this thesis (the Principle of Generic Consistency 
(herein ‘PGC’) outlined at 1.5), I explain why there should be some consideration of a person’s 
‘moral status’ as part of any system for advance refusals. Accordingly, the third chapter begins 
with an outline of the concept of personhood as foundation for discussion of the ongoing 
debate between life and autonomy (i.e. the general aim adopted by the State to preserve life 
7where possible versus one’s personal right to express the moral self in the form of an advance 
refusal). Personhood is a relevant topic as the defining components of persons allow us to 
realise moral status, in law, philosophy, and our everyday lives in general. It is in this chapter 
that the philosophical framework of the PGC begins linking with real life in this thesis. This 
chapter aims to highlight the perils of the MCA 2005’s lack of regard for the issues of 
personhood and of the moral status of persons. Of course defining ‘personhood’ is a task 
beyond this thesis, but this chapter aims to give a firm grounding for an argument to strengthen 
the MCA 2005 so that the question of ‘to what extent does this person matter?’ can be 
answered in each particular case. Without answering this question, it is argued that a person’s 
wishes, values, views and beliefs can never be fully addressed. So, it is presented that if we can 
consider what makes us people per se, that is, the attributes and features forming a person, 
and their unique moral status, we can understand further the importance of understanding 
philosophical concepts of agency. This will be in-keeping with the foundational principle that a 
law concerning only those who ‘matter’ must get those who matter right.
I then outline the main reasons for the primacy of the right to autonomy in chapter four, 
as supported by the ethical theory of Gewirth. I discuss the fundamentally anomalous results 
produced by the debate between life and autonomy which are incompatible with the powerful 
undercurrents of autonomy in the main provisions of the MCA 2005. The concluding remarks in 
this chapter focus mainly on analysis of the varied concoction of judgments in the recent cases 
of NHS Trust v L16, A Local Authority v E17, The X Primary Care Trust v XB18 and Re M.19 It is 
argued that the inconsistent results produced in judgment from these cases must be stabilised 
to preserve autonomy where possible. This becomes problematic, however, when the usual 
features of personal identity become blurred which is an issue addressed in the next chapter.
16NHS Trust v L [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP).
17 A Local Authority v E; [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP).
18The X Primary Care Trust v XB [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
19 Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287. 
8The fifth chapter builds on ideas in chapters three and four, to the effect that that the 
primacy of the right to autonomy ought to be stabilised in reality; this perspective is grounded 
in the ideal of making the MCA 2005’s visions more realistic. The main issue to be addressed in 
this chapter is the MCA 2005’s disregard of the challenges provoked by the personal identity 
problem which should not be, as it is argued, unjustifiably ignored. The personal identity 
problem itself is a problem that considers the relationship between a person and their identity, 
adducing the relevance of the way that we address the continuity of person. The problem 
builds on the notion of personhood. In this thesis, where the question around personhood and 
moral status is:
“To what extent does this person matter?”;
When a person undergoes a severe change in their personality, this question evolves to 
become;
“To what extent does this person’s identity matter?”
Both questions are yet to be fully explored as there is no separate consideration for those who 
suffer from dementia in the MCA 2005.  Actually, current legislation does not give clear 
guidance regarding how best to treat those persons who have undergone severe changes in 
personality and what a severe change of personality may constitute. Varying degrees of 
dementia, for example, may mean that at one moment an advance refusal is valid, and the next 
it is not – there are not even loose guidelines for the point at which a person with dementia 
changes so significantly that an advance refusal no longer applies. I highlight that whilst the 
personal identity problem is not considered as part of the MCA 2005’s main provisions, in truth, 
judges and medical practitioners must recognise this problem, and such recognition needs 
regulation. From this perspective, the MCA 2005 in practice is also analysed – as the medical 
profession is reluctant to apply advance refusals to dementia patients in England and Wales and 
beyond.20 This reluctance equates to recognition of the problem indirectly. It is important to 
outline that the personal identity problem is not always problematic but it is in situations where 
it is arguable that a person’s identity has changed and the person no longer has capacity, it is. 
20 Sheldon 2013.
9The difficulty arises when a person becomes incompetent. In these circumstances, there are 
three positions that may be taken in relation to a person (herein ‘P’):
1) As soon as P becomes incompetent, he becomes someone else;
2) When incompetent, P is always the same person;
3) When P becomes incompetent, he could be the same person, or he could be a 
different person.
In this thesis, the view taken is based upon the last as I apply precaution where possible. 
The penultimate chapter forms an enquiry as to the integrity of the ‘best interests test’ 
– the current welfare test used to judge what is thought to be in a patient’s best interests 
considering all the circumstances, applying, among other occasions, where no valid advance 
refusal has been made. There are issues with the application of this test which jeopardise the 
preservation of a patient’s former wishes, values, views and beliefs. For example, this test 
neither considers what the patient would have wanted if he could have made the decision for 
himself now, nor does it honour consideration of the conflicting rights of others.21 This broad 
criticism of the test is explored further and, as an alternative, I explore the use of a system of 
order for use of tests which combines the ‘best interests test’, the ‘substituted judgment 
standard’, (a standard which attempts to establish with as much accuracy as possible what 
decision the patient would have made if that patient were competent to do so) and the ‘overall 
interests test’ (a concept created by Shaun Pattinson considering the rights of all parties 
involved where rights conflict22).
Chapter seven concludes the thesis by summarising disparities between the intentions 
of the MCA 2005 and the application of the main provisions in reality. This concluding chapter 
explores the notion that without attending to such difficult ethical and social problems in 
implementation, the MCA 2005 fails to do what it set out to do.  
21 I return to this point about conflicting rights at 6.2 & 6.3.
22 Pattinson 2011, 166.
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1.5 Moral Basis
“Persons guide their lives in many different ways. Among the various goals, rules, habits, 
ideals, institutions that figure more or less explicitly in such guidance, morality has a 
unique status”.23
The subject of this thesis is ethically controversial. I therefore need a criterion of morality. The 
ethical approach taken in this thesis is based on a model of morality devised by Alan Gewirth in 
the PGC.24 I offer two reasons as to why I use this:
1) The theory seeks to use logic as grounds for morality. The first part of the argument 
seeks to show that an agent denies they are an agent if they do not accept the PGC. This 
element of the argument is termed ‘dialectically necessary’; it is ‘dialectical’ as it relates 
to agency and it is deemed ‘necessary’ as all steps are necessary leading to it. For Kant, 
Gewirth and Beyleveld, in (respectively) the Categorical Imperative (Kant)25 and the PGC 
(Gewirth26 and Beyleveld27), the dialectical necessity element of each argument is 
central.
2) The second (and most relevant) reason (developed by Beyleveld28) is that the 
argument is also ‘dialectically contingent’, again the ‘dialectical’ element relates to 
agency, and this presentation of the argument is ‘contingent’ as it contingently relies on 
the existence of human rights in practice. 
Building on this, a brief description of the relevance of my use of the PGC is outlined succinctly 
here: 
23Gewirth 1978, 1.
24 See Gewirth, 1978. 
25 Kant, 1785, as translated in Paton 1948.
26 See Gewirth 1978.
27 See Beyleveld 1991.
28 Beyleveld 2012.
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“Like Kant’s argument for ‘the moral law’, this (PGC) aims to demonstrate that the idea 
of morality, viewed as a categorically binding set of norms requiring all agents to be 
treated with equal concern and respect, is not a delusion. Kant cogently maintains that 
if morality is characterised as categorically binding such a demonstration must establish 
that the moral law is connected (completely a priori) with the concept of the will of a 
rational being as such”.29
The purpose of this thesis is only to use the PGC as the basis for moral discussion, not to defend 
it. 
1.5.1 Dialectically Necessary
Per Deryck Beyleveld, the three main stages of the dialectically necessary argument to the PGC 
are as follows:30
(I) “I am an agent” so “I accept that I ought to pursue the Generic Conditions of Agency
(herein ‘GCA’- those conditions conducive to agency)”. The GCA are divided into three 
hierarchical levels of ‘needs’, beginning with those classed as ‘basic’:
1) ‘Basic needs’ (needed to be able to act at all).
2) ‘Non-subtractive needs’ (needed to maintain an agent’s ability to act), -
those actions an agent pursues to maintain the current level.
3) ‘Additive needs’ (needed in order to be able to improve an agent’s ability 
to act); additional action(s) pursued to the end of further fulfilment.
Therefore, in relation to the fact that “I am an agent, I have some purposes that I must accept”, 
it follows that “I ought to defend my possession of the GCA”.   
(II) It then follows analytically from “I ought to defend my possession of the GCA” that “I 
have the Generic Rights (herein ‘GR’; those rights enabling action)”. Where the criterion is that I 
categorically instrumentally ought to defend my having the GCA, it is dialectically necessary for 
29 Beyleveld 2012, 3.
30 The basis for the format of argument is derived from lectures delivered by Deryck Beyleveld in 
2008/2009 (as part of the Law and Medicine module of the Law (LLB) course at Durham University).
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me to prescriptively accept this criterion, which means that I must prescriptively accept that 
others categorically ought not to interfere with my having the GCA (i.e. categorically ought not 
to interfere with my having the GCA against my will) etc. Hence I must accept that I have the 
GR. Some allege that it is not intelligible to prescribe that others not interfere with my having 
the GCA in this context. This is where the PGC is met with criticism, as is the next stage of the 
PGC.  
(III) It must follow purely logically from {I am an agent  I have the GR}I that {X is an agent 
 X has the GR}I31. This aspect of the dialectically necessary argument relies on two reasons for 
acceptance; a categorical prudential reason (i.e. denial of stage 2) and to the avoidance of 
contradicting that I am an agent (stage 1). 
Stages II) and III) of the PGC have not been met without criticism, indeed Brown 
remarked that such criticism was ‘widespread’32 but that the argument was fundamentally 
misunderstood, which was also a view taken by Gewirth33. Such criticism has stemmed most 
significantly from Marcus Singer,34 Bernard Williams35 and Christine Korsgaard.36 Singer’s 
criticism was responded to in full by Beyleveld,37 a modern day Gewirthian. The criticism itself 
mainly focused on definition and interpretation of and wording used in what Beyleveld labelled 
the argument for ‘sufficiency of agency’ as central to an aspect of dialectically necessity 
criterion for agency.38 Particular doubt has been expressed over stage 3 of the argument and 
the internal viewpoint of the agent, i.e. ‘why I ought I to defend the rights of others and respect 
these in the same manner as respecting and upholding my own’?39
Since an argumentative chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and because proving 
the dialectically necessary argument for the PGC is a matter to be dealt with in and of itself, I 
31 Ibid.
32 Brown 2004, 93. 
33Gewirth 1978.
34 Singer, M. 1985, 297-301.
35Williams 1985, see particuarly chapter 4.
36 Korsgaard 1996, 93-96.
37 Beyeveld 2002.
38 Ibid.
39 See Williams 1985, chapter 4 for further. See also Korsgaard 1996, 93.
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will be referring only to the first stage of Gewirth’s dialectically necessary argument in this 
thesis. I contend that this stage is sound and building on this, the argument that I use is a 
dialectically contingent argument to the PGC.
1.5.2 Dialectically Contingent Argument to the PGC
Again taken from an argument formulated by Deryck Beyleveld,40 if we add stage 1 of the 
dialectically necessary argument and combine it with the existence of human rights legislation, 
we have a dialectically contingent argument which is undeniable on pain of contradiction. From 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (herein ‘HRA’) to the fundamental principles of the all-governing 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (herein ‘UDHR’) we find that rights are conferred on all 
individuals in equal measure from birth. As an example, adding stage one of the PGC i.e.  ‘I am 
an agent- I have the Generic Rights’ to the following excerpt (from the UDHR), equates to the 
first stage of the PGC in action:
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”.41
The same applies to part of the foundation for Articles 1 and 2 of UNESCO's Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1997:42
Article 1
“The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human 
family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic 
sense, it is the heritage of humanity”;
Article 2
40 Please see Beyleveld 2012 for further expansion of this point.
41UDHR Preamble (art.1).
42 The principle works also with Article 2 of the UDHR.
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“(a) Everyone has a right to respect for their dignity and for their rights regardless of 
their genetic characteristics”; and
“(b) That dignity makes it imperative not to reduce individuals to their genetic 
characteristics and to respect their uniqueness and diversity”.43
The first stage of the PGC is also embedded44 in the ECHR. 
The nature and principle of these rights revolve around equality, in this way, forming a network 
of rights based upon a dialectically contingent45 argument implying a distinct commitment to 
universalisability of rights. This dialectically contingent argument means that anyone who 
accepts human rights must accept stage 1 of the PGC and all of the elements in stage 1. This is 
clearly reflected in the law as shown in sections from human rights legislation above so this 
thesis follows the premise laid out by Beyleveld:
“It follows, on pain of denying that all human beings are equal in dignity and inalienable 
rights, that it is dialectically necessary for those who accept and implement the UDHR to 
consider that all permissible action must be consistent with the requirements of the 
PGC. It follows that all agents (including judges and legislators) purporting to interpret 
the instruments of the international legal system of human rights must likewise do so in 
accordance with the PGC. In this sense, the validity of stage one of the dialectically 
necessary argument entails that the PGC is the supreme principle of human rights”.46
As described, the PGC has two justificatory strategies. The first is the three stage dialectically
necessary argument; the second is a combination of stage one of that argument added to the 
existence of human rights, thus giving us a dialectically contingent argument. Where the law is 
morally controversial, I will address matters using the dialectically contingent argument to the 
PGC. 
43Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights November 11th 1997. 
44 To an extent; the Article 12 (ECHR) right to marry is not universalisable, for example, as ages of 
consent vary.
45 See Beyleveld 1997 for further.
46 Beyleveld 2012, 8.
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1.6 The Relevance of Agency, Autonomy and the PGC
A fundamental principle employed in Gewirth’s theory is the freedom of action of agents. The 
success of autonomous action has been dual categorised; ‘agent autonomy’ per Alan Gewirth 
and Deryck Beyleveld, and, building on this, ‘task-specific’ competence, per Shaun Pattinson.47
Gewirth’s PGC, supports the notion of autonomy (whilst not absolutely). This is 
presented by the presupposition that agents ought to pursue their purposes freely and 
voluntarily regardless of what these may be. Autonomy is at the heart of the PGC. This is 
demonstrated as Gewirth defines action as holding two broad features – voluntariness (or 
freedom) and purposiveness (or intentionality) and these two requirements for action relate 
directly to the definition of competence. Also, as a generic condition of agency, one of the 
‘basic freedoms’ granted to agents includes the freedom to act according to one’s chosen 
purposes and freedom of thought.48 Under the PGC, contemporaneous decisions would be 
treated with the same respect as advance decisions (both general advance refusals and 
advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment) remembering that the PGC also allows people to 
be released from all duties (i.e. the duty to sustain life per the Hippocratic Oath). From this, if I 
can make a decision now to refuse treatment, this can also apply to a later date, where I can no 
longer make or communicate it. 
47 Pattinson 2011, 148 and 150.
48Gewirth 1978, 52-53.
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CHAPTER TWO: A BACKGROUND AND GENERAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICACY OF THE MCA 
2005’S MAIN PROVISIONS
2.1 Finding the Value in Advance Refusals
An advance refusal is a decision made by a person addressing a later inability to make decisions 
on treatment. Such decisions can demand or refuse the kinds of treatment specified by their
maker. From classical folklore49 through to statutorily regulated modern day application, the 
implications of advance refusals, valid or not, have induced widespread legal and ethical 
debate.
Advance refusals may be made by the person themselves or/and through the 
appointment of another person, a ‘Lasting Power of Attorney’.50 An advance refusal must exist, 
be valid,51 and applicable.52 To satisfy these requirements, it must be shown that the creator 
(here ‘C’):
1) Had capacity at the time of creating the advance refusal;
2) Specified the particular treatment in question;
3) Has not done anything else clearly inconsistent with the advance refusal. And 
specifically with advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment; 
4) Made the advance refusal in writing, authenticated by two signatures, one from C 
(or on behalf of C), and one from a witness; and finally,
5) Expressly states that it is to apply even if life is at risk. 
49 This point refers particularly to the tale of Odysseus discussed at 1.2.
50 Per ss.9 to 11 of the MCA 2005.
51 A valid advance refusal must be made according to criterion outlined in ss.24 to 26 MCA 2005.
52 Yet even this is rebuttable as in R. (N and Another)[2009] HRLR 31 and where it is ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ the right will be overridden via art. 8(2) ECHR.
17
There is without doubt some degree of value in the use of advance refusals. They protect the 
autonomous interests of their creator, and in turn, they also preserve the creator’s values and 
desires; amounting to a snap-shot of the creator’s mindful intentions and an embodiment of 
their own choice and direction. Respect and dignity are two key components in any law 
pledging to uphold advance refusals. 
The importance of advance refusals is also highlighted when considering the danger of 
others assigning the wrong values and attitudes to a person. It is undeniably difficult, outside of 
the realms of first-person autonomy, to vicariously prescribe a person’s wishes, values, views 
and beliefs in every circumstance. This is illustrated in the contrasting accounts of life ambitions 
and directions of Ruth Sienkiewicz-Mercer and Tony Nicklinson. Both parties were severely 
disabled with degenerative conditions which would eventually lead to death. Both parties 
placed differing significance on their lives.
For Nicklinson, a right-to-die activist, who suffered a devastating brain-stem stroke 
resulting in locked-in syndrome (where a person has a level of consciousness but cannot move 
(with the exception usually, of the eyelids) or communicate verbally), death was something 
actively welcomed:
“My life can be summed up as dull, miserable, demeaning, undignified and intolerable. 
…it is misery created by the accumulation of lots of things which are minor in 
themselves but, taken together, ruin what's left of my life. Things like…constant 
dribbling; having to be hoisted everywhere; loss of independence…particularly toileting 
and washing, in fact all bodily functions (by far the hardest thing to get used to); having 
to forgo favourite foods; … having to wait until 10.30 to go to the toilet…in extreme 
circumstances I have gone in the chair, and have sat there until the carers arrived at the 
normal time”.53
53 R. (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381 at 13.
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Yet Sienkiewicz-Mercer, a lifetime quadriplegic and victim of cerebral palsy, who was ‘confined 
to a wheelchair or bed for every waking hour of her life’ with a ‘functionally useless’ body,54
considered her life worth living.  Thus, although life was similarly reminiscent of an everyday 
struggle, hers became dedicated to her ‘triumphant’55 career as an American disability rights 
activist, living by the mantra, ‘I could overcome my physical limitations by hard work and 
education’.56
Advance refusals also serve as shields, protecting the bodily integrity of their creators, 
especially pragmatic where medical intervention becomes an endurance in itself which is less 
welcome than death. 
There are, of course limits as to the efficacy of advance refusals which any law providing 
for them must attend to. Alan Buchanan describes the main issues as the ‘three asymmetries’:57
1) Even where an advance refusal was issued and the individual was well-informed 
about the options available, both therapeutic options and prognosis may change; 
2) It is always, in any case, questionable that a competent person is the best judge of 
her own interests under conditions in which those interests have changed in ‘radical and 
unforeseen ways’;58 and in any case
3) ‘Important informal safeguards’ should be in place to restrain important decisions or 
bad choices are not likely to be present, or effective, in the case of an advance refusal.  
Whilst the issues highlighted by Buchanan’s model are partially accounted for in the 2005 Act,59
there are many more issues to be ironed out within our own framework for advance refusals. 
54 Sienkiewicz-Mercer and Kaplan 1989, 1.
55 The Washington Post commented (on Ruth’s biography); ‘what Sienkiewicz-Mercer has made of her 
life is nothing short of a triumph’. See front cover , Sienkiewicz-Mercer and Kaplan 1989.
56 Sienkiewicz-Mercer and Kaplan 1989, 157.
57 Buchanan 1988, 278-281.
58 Buchanan 1988, 279.
59 Ibid s.4 (b)and c)) where an advance decision is not applicable to the treatment in question if—
(b)any circumstances specified…are absent, or
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Thus, whilst there is value to be found in advance refusals as a concept, their 
implementation in practice can either be a means of respecting individual autonomy, or of 
providing a false sense of the same. When this occurs, the ‘right’ conferred (in this case, the 
right to present and future preservation of autonomy) is too difficult to invoke in practice due 
to complexities. At the very heart of this is the fact that no ‘universal moral approach’ is 
entrenched in the MCA 2005, so the application of advance refusals is curtailed by the issues 
faced in everyday life application including the conflicting rights of others, the right to 
autonomy, issues around personal identity and so on.  If a clear-cut moral code was seen to be 
embedded in the 2005 Act, this would allow for full effect to be given to the value to be found 
in advance refusals.
2.2 The Law on Advance Refusals: From Re T60 to the MCA 2005: A U- Turn?
Preceding the enactment of the MCA 2005, confusion surrounding validity, applicability, extent 
and the role of first-person capacity arose from the myriad of judicial dicta in this area. 
Individual autonomy over future decisions was either restricted or valorised, but often for the 
wrong reasons.61
Re T62 is a prime example of a case detailing lack of consideration of the decision-making 
capacity of persons (the same case set out the first guidelines specifically relating to advance 
refusals by incapacitated adults). The case concerned a pregnant Jehovah’s Witness who, 
following a car crash, had refused to consent to a blood transfusion. This refusal was in writing, 
and was a direct result of a conversation with her mother, also a staunch Jehovah’s Witness. 
Due to an emergency caesarean section, where Ms T needed a blood transfusion, the 
applicability of this advance refusal came under scrutiny. As she was unconscious at this time, 
(c) there are reasonable grounds for believing that circumstances exist which P did not anticipate at the 
time of the advance decision and which would have affected his decision had he anticipated them.
60 Ibid [1993] Fam.95.
61 See for example Re T [1993] Fam. 95 even though was an advance refusal made, the court declared 
presumption in favour of life and enforced the blood transfusion despite the fact that Lord Donaldson 
himself declared that an advance refusal was as valid as a contemporaneous refusal if it was ‘clearly 
established and applicable in the circumstances’.
62 Re T [1993] Fam.95.
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her brother and boyfriend sought a declaration from the court to the effect that, despite the 
advance refusal made by Ms T, the transfusion would not be unlawful. The Court of Appeal 
authorised the treatment. Ms T’s rights to bodily integrity and personal autonomy were 
overridden by the sanctity of life presumption;63 it was held that this would be the case where 
doubt existed and an advance refusal could not be deemed as ‘clearly established and 
applicable in the circumstances’.64 In Re T, the court also addressed the matter of undue 
influence — where a patient’s decision is influenced in way meaning that they are pressurised 
by another — and it was decided that where this could be established, a patient could not been 
seen to have made an advance refusal.65 The problem was that personal autonomy had not 
been exercised as undue influence had occurred. The outlook that the sanctity of life 
presumption would be invoked where doubt exists over an advance refusal was also reaffirmed 
in the later case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.66 It was also held in Re T67 that where an 
advance refusal was ambiguous, this was a matter to be presented at court. This is a principle 
which remains in operation today. 
In Re AK,68 the NHS trust responsible for the treatment of a 19 year old patient with 
motor neurone disease (herein ‘MND’), sought a declaration that it would be lawful to comply 
with his advance refusal. Particularly, AK had communicated, through the use of his eyelid, his 
wishes that the artificial nutrition, hydration (herein ‘ANH’) and ventilation he relied on, be 
removed, which was to occur two weeks from the date at which point he completely lost the 
ability to communicate. The advance refusal was declared valid by Hughes, J. on the basis that 
AK had full capacity and was able to refuse in advance. At the time of judgment, the HRA 1998 
was in the process of giving full effect to the ECHR which Hughes, J. also declared as being 
consistent with his view. 
63 Ibid, Lord Donaldson at 103. And affirmed in the latter cases of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland. [1993] A.C. 
789 and Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426.
64 Ibid at 103 to 104.
65 Re T [1993] Fam.95.
66 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789.
67 Ibid [1993] Fam.95.
68Re AK [2001] 1 F.L.R. 129.
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The last significant judgment concerning the validity of an advance refusal prior to the 
MCA 2005 is to be found in HE v Hospital NHS Trust.69 HE, the father of the 24 year old patient 
D, applied for a declaration that a blood transfusion could be administered to his daughter as a 
means of life-sustaining treatment. D had signed an ‘advance medical directive’ four years 
earlier rejecting a blood transfusion on the basis of her faith, as at this time she was a practising 
Jehovah’s Witness. D also stated that the directive could only be revoked in writing. HE’s 
declaration was granted on two grounds. The first of these was that D’s beliefs and values were 
not reflected in the advance refusal; as D ceased to worship as a Jehovah's Witness for some 
months before her illness, and was currently engaged to a Muslim man and in the process of 
committing to his faith. The second was that an advance refusal can be revoked in any way–
orally, by conduct, or by other means (i.e. not restricted to written revocation).
From these three cases, any doubt concerning the validity of an advance refusal before the 
MCA 2005 took effect meant that decisions over the treatment of patients were to be made in 
favour of preservation of life. Many of the decisions at common law restricted the use of 
advance refusals. Indeed pre-MCA 2005, advance refusals were not treated uniformly due to a 
lack of boundaries indicating the need for delineated threshold criteria. Hence, after much call 
for statutory reform regarding the treatment of adults lacking capacity,70 the MCA 2005 was 
enacted.71
2.3 The MCA 2005
The main purpose of the MCA 2005 was to unite the notion of patient autonomy, both future 
and present, with the best interests principle. The default presupposition of individual 
autonomy can be overridden where a lack of capacity is ascertained. In this instance, the best 
interests test is triggered. The MCA 2005’s Code of Practice (herein ‘MCA CoP’) outlines the 
69HE v Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam).
70Michalowski 2005, 960.
71 The need for statutory provision concerning the creation of advance directives was highlighted in the 
Law Commissions Report no.231 ‘Mental Incapacity’ 1995. Created ten years later, the MCA 2005 
provides such statutory regulation in ss.24 to 26.
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process of capacity and decision-making per the Act, supporting the Act’s s.1 provisions. Here, 
family and other carers must assume that a person has the capacity to make decisions, unless it 
can be established that they do not. The MCA CoP encourages that help is offered to patients 
so that they can make their own decisions. The MCA CoP affirms the MCA 2005 in that unwise 
decisions are still valid decisions if the maker has capacity72 and urges that, in the absence of 
any advance refusal, a person’s ‘best interests’, and ‘basic rights and freedoms’, are the sole 
and prime considerations to be made.73
In addition to codifying common law principles, the MCA 2005 provides many new 
optional formalities. These include advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment, provision for 
any Lasting Power of Attorney (herein ‘LPA’) which enables a person to choose others to act on 
their behalf when mental capacity is lost (in the case of health and welfare LPAs),74
appointment of deputies, and creation of the Court of Protection. The Act gives effect to an 
advance refusal that is both ‘valid’ and ‘applicable to the treatment in question’ if it was made 
by an adult with capacity to make it at the time. 
In terms of ‘validity’ per s. 25(2), an advance refusal need not be created or evidenced in 
writing unless it regards the rejection of life-sustaining treatment in which case it must be 
signed by both the author and a witness and in writing.75 There are no formal requirements for 
revocation of either. An advance refusal is not valid if a person has:
“1) Withdrawn the decision at a time when he had capacity to do so;
2) Conferred authority on the donee/s (LPA) to give or refuse consent to the treatment 
to which the advance refusal relates; or 
72 Ibid s.2(3).
73 See the Code of Practice: DoCA 2007, 20.
74MCA 2005 s.25(2)(b)and(7).
75 S.25(5)and(6) MCA 2005.
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3) Done anything else clearly inconsistent with the advance refusal (remaining his fixed 
decision)”.76
The new Court of Protection is afforded statutory power77 to decide the validity and 
applicability of an advance refusal where they seem ambiguous.  The ruling given by Theis, J. in 
The X Primary Care Trust v XB78 has been the latest notable decision in the Court of Protection 
regarding the validity of an advance refusal of life-sustaining treatment. Here, a very pragmatic 
overall approach was taken to what could have otherwise been a lexical minefield. In this case, 
the issue was the accidental inclusion of an ‘end-date’ in the advance refusal due to the 
template being obtained from an internet website – as a bi-product of the degenerative nature 
of the patient’s illness, there was, in reality, no ‘end-date’ where the refusal would expire 
logically. There are, of course, numerous issues thrown up by the term ‘validity’ – these refer 
to the timeframe of the refusal, any ostensible change in thought or behaviour patterns of the 
creator and other generic changes in circumstances. 
Under the MCA 2005, an advance refusal is not applicable to the treatment in question if a 
person has not defined such treatment unequivocally.  To be ‘applicable’ the treatment refused 
must:79
“a) Be specified;
b) Include all circumstances present; and 
c) Refer to circumstances presently existing which the maker did not anticipate at the 
time of making the advance decision which would have affected his decision, had he  
anticipated these present circumstances”.
As discussed in the introduction to this piece, the bar is set higher for the process of creating 
applicable advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment. These must be signed, witnessed and 
in writing, but their revocation may be oral. In addition, to establish whether an advance refusal 
76 Ibid s.25(2)(a) to (c)
77 S.26(4).
78 The X Primary Care Trust v XB [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
79MCA 2005 s.25(4)(a) to (c).
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is valid and applicable (even where it appears to be so based upon all other criteria), medical 
professionals must attempt to find out if the person: 
“Has done anything that clearly goes against their advance refusal, has withdrawn their 
decision (and/or), has subsequently conferred the power to make that decision on an 
attorney, or would have changed their decision if they had known more about the 
current circumstances”.80
The position of those in the medical profession is also provided for; under s.26 (1) of the MCA 
2005, a person does not incur liability for carrying out or continuing treatment unless, at the 
time, he is satisfied that an advance refusal exists which is valid and applicable to the 
treatment. Also, per s.26 (2), any medical professional who reasonably believes that an advance 
refusal is valid and applicable to the treatment concerned will avoid liability. If the healthcare 
professional in question is unsure as to the effect or validity of an advance refusal, they may 
refer this to the Court of Protection. In actuality, per s.26 MCA 2005, a healthcare professional 
is presented with four outcomes if the patient has made an advance refusal:
1) If the doctor ignores a valid advance refusal, he is guilty of committing the tort of 
battery, and the crime of assault;
2) If the doctor ignores an advance refusal that cannot be deemed valid and applicable 
for the purposes of the act, he is not guilty of anything; 
3) If he follows an advance refusal which is either valid or invalid, this is likely to result in 
the death of his patient; and
4) If he follows an advance refusal which is not valid (and he does not reasonably 
believe it is valid s.26(2)), he is guilty of murder.  
In practice, where an advance refusal has been made and is slightly ambiguous, doctors who 
are afraid of committing murder would rather commit a potential tort or battery, and courts 
80See the Code of Practice: DoCA 2007, 159.
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adopt a presumption in favour of life.81 This adds to what has been described as ‘dangerous’; 
the problem of ‘paternalism’ in the medical practice.82 By the same token, where there is an 
existing and lawful advance refusal, if this is ignored doctors face criminal and civil action and 
being struck-off by the GMC. This new-age of not endlessly attempting to save the lives of 
patients has even been reported as inconsistent with the Hippocratic Oath – a newspaper 
commented on the then Lord Chancellor’s heavy-handed ‘draconian’ approach towards 
‘enforcing living wills’:
“Lord Falconer's message to the medical profession told doctors and nurses that new 
laws will require them to end lives rather than save them… Those who decline to do so 
will face jail or, alternatively, big compensation claims in the courts”.83
2.4 Best Interests Test?
In the absence of a valid and applicable advance refusal, and where a patient is unable to give 
consent, his treatment is viewed in line with what is in his best interests. Re F84saw the 
revitalisation of the ‘best interests test’ (i.e. an assessment of what is best for that 
incapacitated patient all circumstances considered) and the welfare principle long preceding it. 
The position at common law is now the position in the MCA 2005. From Re F85, the medical 
profession were asked to holistically consider the patient’s needs, weighing these against action 
in the face of refusal of treatment and to consider their capacity to make such decisions. The 
outcome of the same case provided that lawfully, healthcare professionals were able to 
operate on those adults unable to consent to or to refuse treatment by way of ‘emergency’ or 
81 See Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287 for example where Mrs. M after 8 years of receiving 
ANH was deemed able to appreciate her surroundings enough in a state of MCS to remain in this state 
despite regular communication to her family throughout her life detailing that she would not want to be 
kept alive in such circumstances.
82 Buchanan 1988, 279. As explicated by Buchanan, the ‘well documented persistence of unjustified 
paternalistic behaviour by physicians indicates that this is a significant danger’.
83 See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-417093/Doctors-face-prison-denying-right-die.html 
<accessed 14/11/13>
84 Re F [1990] 2 A.C. 1.
85 Re F [1990] 2 A.C. 1.
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‘mental disability’ if the treatment could be shown as being in the patient's ‘best 
interests’. Here, sterilisation was held to be in the patient’s best interests, attracting great 
criticism over replication of the Nazi attitude towards de-sexualisation of the mentally 
disabled.86 Although more regulated, this approach is still taken now.87 The law of England and 
Wales offers no system by which the expressed opposition of a mentally handicapped person to 
an operation is considered fully where it is judged by others as being in their best interests. 
With regard to the matter of conflicting rights of others, the PGC, and specifically, the three 
levels of generic rights outlined at 1.5.1 earlier, would provide guidance. 
Due to the extent of argument, there is a whole chapter88 dedicated to discussion of the 
efficacy of this test. As a brief outline, in the absence of capacity, Lord Goff’s objective best 
interests test as established in Re F 89 is now partly codified in the 2005 Act.90 The test allows 
for judgment of what is best for an incapacitated patient ‘all things considered’. Yet, in line with 
Mary Donnelly’s assessment the test is ambiguous and ‘what exactly is meant by patient’s best 
interests is neither self-evident nor all together clear’.91
The standard for judging best interests is in fact applied subjectively. Most recently, in 
the cases of A Local Authority v E92 and Re M93 the patient’s best interests were decided on the 
basis of the value of their lives, despite the fact that the patients themselves were both in the 
86 Shaw 1990, 93.
87 It may be said as an aside that any non-therapeutic sterilisation of a mentally handicapped persons is 
always to be regulated and assessed by the courts by way of Practice Direction 9E to the Court of 
Protection Rules 2007 , and Para.6.18 and Paras.8.18-8.29 of the Code of Practice: DoCA 2007. This 
position was most recently affirmed in A Local Authority v K (by the Official Solicitor) [2013].
88 See chapter six.
89Ibid [1990] 2 A.C. 1.
90 S.4 of the MCA2005 outlines the test as follows s.4(1); that the decision must not be made in light of 
i.e. person’s age or appearance, s4.(2)-(3); considerations to be made by those ‘making the 
determination’, s4(4)-(11) the specifics, and for this piece most importantly for this thesis; s.4 (6)He 
must consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable—(a)the person's past and present wishes and 
feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity),(b)the 
beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity, and(c)the other 
factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so. 
91Donnelly 2011.
92 A Local Authority v E(2012) EWHC 1639 (COP); 2 F.C.R. 523
93 Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287. 
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latter stages of palliative care. There is a compelling argument that the best interests test is 
flawed. Such argument seems to be categorised into three main areas: lack of consideration of 
first-person autonomy; the patronising, paternalistic use of Article 2 ECHR (the right to life); and 
the lack of consideration of the conflicting, overall rights of others. Too regularly, the 
competing interests of first-person autonomy and the right to life clash – this is discussed more 
comprehensively in the next chapter.
Undoubtedly, the best interests test throws up issues around whether or not a person’s 
past wishes, values, views and beliefs are being preserved. Questions left unanswered in many 
cases revolve around the required level of evidence needed to show what the patient wanted. 
Other issue are centred around the motives or capabilities of those communicating the 
incapacitated person’s ‘past wishes and feelings’. As well as this, the overarching worry in 
general is the verity of those who are not appointed as legal guardians as having an influence 
on the fate of someone connected to them. Additionally, even those who are appointed may be 
unsuitable decision-makers. In the latter parts of this thesis, this aspect becomes the 
foundation for an argument that that the test should be changed and re-formulated, and a 
hierarchy of tests are outlined to allow for negation of problems caused under the current 
system. 
2.5 In Reality 
The main provisions of the MCA 2005 allow for the autonomous decisions of a person 
concerning their medical treatment where proved valid and applicable. Yet, there are a number 
of practical problems to consider with implementation.
When relating these elements to the advance refusal provisions in the MCA 2005, there 
are three major design flaws (among others), which amount to problems with 1) integration, 2) 
clarity; and, 3) morality. These will be addressed in turn.
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2.5.1 Integration
The danger of a law which is not properly integrated into society is that the law itself becomes 
defunct. A good example of this is found in the (very short) Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 
(herein ‘FGMA 2003’) which, through lack of promulgation and integration into society, has 
fallen on deaf ears. The spirit of the act was to make any degree of non-medicinal genital 
mutilation on women and girls, completely illegal (ss.1 to 2 FGMA 2003). Additionally, the Act’s 
ascribed maximum penalty for perpetrators of the crime is imprisonment for up to 14 years (s.5 
(a)). Despite promises, and recent hopes of the Crown Prosecution Service (herein ‘CPS’) that 
arrests will be made imminently,94 there have been absolutely no prosecutions what-so-ever 95
of those committing this crime which reportedly affects around 3000 women and girls in the UK 
each year.96
There are many failings of the FGMA 2003 that the MCA 2005 can learn from. One 
shared issue between the two pieces of legislation is that access to the provisions has been 
stunted. The FGMA 2003 must blame associated reporting measures for victims, lacking 
deterrence and other procedural defects as impairing implementation per se. 97
The difficulty of creating an advance refusal is preventing osmosis of the provisions. This 
does not seem to be ameliorated by healthcare professionals. As stated in the Mental Health 
Foundation’s literature review of the MCA 2005 ‘the creation of advance directives was 
facilitated through early introduction by practitioners and continuous discussion between 
practitioners and service users’.98 Unfortunately, it is without doubt that the healthcare 
profession is overlooking the importance of advance refusals today – this has especially been 
proven in the treatment of those who already have pre-existing cognitive impairments who are 
found to be prejudged as being incompetent. The decisions made by such persons are being 
94 See Gerry 2012.
95However, this may change for the better See Torjesen 2013. 
96See Chalabi 2013. 
97 See Gerry 2012.
98Mental Health Foundation 2012, para 8.3 at p. 56.
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questioned as healthcare professionals are deeming them ‘unwise’.99 These are two direct 
violations of principles 1 and 3 of the Code of Practice and of s.1(4) and s.1(2) MCA 2005.100 In 
addition, from a transparency perspective, there are no recordings of the amount of advance 
refusals in existence, granted, or ignored, and with this, no archiving or registration system. 
Keeping records and copies stored centrally does occur in relation to LPA documents which are 
safely stored with the Office of the Public Guardian. Invariably, a paper trail is especially helpful 
when documents are lost or where it is uncertain as to whether a document exists.
2.5.2 Clarity
The advance refusals provisions within the MCA 2005 are largely unheard of. If they are known, 
they are thought of as being too difficult to use. This view is supported by a recent poll showing 
that only 8% of the population had already created a living will with over 50% pledging that 
they would, if it was ‘easier’. 101
There are number of pro forma advance refusals available on various sites across the 
internet with Mind, Age UK, Compassion in Dying, Alzheimer’s Society and Help the Hospices 
being just a few providers. Despite the attempts of such charities, where online templates are 
readily available,102 the layperson is still having difficulties in giving effect to their autonomous 
wishes. One of the difficulties in using these pro formas is that they can be discombobulating 
for the potential advance refusal creator. In the recent case of The X Primary Care Trust v XB,103
inclusion in the pro forma of a ‘valid until’ date led to a degree of scrutiny from the Court of 
Protection. There is an argument that those organizations that have such terms in their pro 
formas may want to look again at the necessity of such terms. It is clearly in the interests of the 
person who has made the advance refusal, their family, and those who have responsibility for 
providing or withholding treatment that there is clarity in relation to what the terms of the 
99Mental Health Foundation 2010.
100 See the Code of Practice: DoCA 2007, 20 and 24.
101 Alderson, 2010. 
102 For more information please see the extensive websites of Mind available at 
http://www.mind.org.uk/ and Alzheimers Society at http://www.alzheimers.org.uk/ respectively 
<accessed 03/05/2013>
103 Ibid [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
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advance refusal are. It has been suggested that this may be addressed through a new 
registration system, amongst other things, but this remains to be seen. The difficulties around 
the creation of both general advance refusals and advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment 
have also been notably recognised in the Mental Health Foundation’s literature review of the 
MCA 2005:
“Advance directives were often limited and views were divided about how specific and 
detailed they should be. Advance directives that were too specific became difficult to 
adhere to. If they included a broad range of specific preferences, it may reduce the 
number of best interests refusals and dilemmas for practitioners”. 104
The caveats laid down in ss.24 to 26 of the MCA 2005 are essential. However, to a layperson, 
the formalities of execution render the process complicated. Another issue, uncovered of late 
in The X Primary Care Trust v XB105 and Re M,106 is that where the modern day allows for a 
person’s thoughts, wishes and feelings to be shared through a vast array of means of 
communication, many do not understand or appreciate the formalities of the MCA 2005. In Re 
M specifically, there was no ‘valid and applicable’ advance refusal held to exist, although M 
had, throughout her life, made a series of advance refusals orally with several members of her 
family as witnesses.107 Three of the main issues rendering the main provisions inaccessible are 
the rigidity of the guidelines for creation, lack of support and guidance from healthcare 
professionals and the general attitude of persons that such a process is ‘morbid’.108
2.5.3 ‘Morally Unsound’
Naturally there are complex moral implications of the advance refusals (and other) provisions 
within the MCA 2005. One moral problem is that due to the level of capacity required by the 
Act, many with pre-existing cognitive defects are unable to ‘make the grade’. Mackenzie and 
104 Mental Health Foundation 2012,  56.
105The X Primary Care Trust v XB [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
106 Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287.
107 Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287, 41 to 46.
108 Dear 2008.
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Rogers attribute this not to the standard set by the MCA 2005, but by the higher standards 
presented in the guidelines in the Code of Practice (see 1.4):
“In order to effectively implement its governing principles and promote the 
autonomy of persons whose capacities are impaired, health and social welfare 
professionals must go beyond a primarily cognitive approach to capacity assessment 
and refer to a range of more demanding autonomy conditions relating to authenticity, 
diachronic coherence and consistency, accountability to others, and affective attitudes 
towards oneself”.109
Another major criticism of the MCA 2005 is the lack of consideration for the view that the s.24 
to 26 provisions should only relate to those who will later experience natural, terminal 
situations. This would exclude those who attempt suicide and make an advance refusal not to 
be ‘saved’ when attempting suicide. This issue was presented in the 2007 case of Kerrie 
Wooltorton, which saw the MCA 2005 being used as a sword, and the subject of a call for ‘new 
boundaries’.110 Wooltorton, a suicide victim with a borderline personality disorder, executed a 
living will preventing medical intervention after poisoning herself. When she presented herself 
at the hospital requesting palliative care with the advance refusal she had drafted in 
possession, she was found to have capacity to refuse life-sustaining treatment. This was 
determined by the consultant renal physician who felt intervention may have led to ‘assault’ 
and ‘being sued’, leaving medics unable to save her life.111
The Mental Health Act 1983112 (herein ‘MHA 1983’) enables the treatment, admittance 
and detention (in hospital) of people with ‘mental disorders’113 without consent where 
necessary for the health or safety of the patient, or for the protection of others. Under the 
109 Rogers 2013.
110 Richardson 2013.
111 Comments given by treating consultant Alexander Heaton, see BBC News (2009) ‘Doctors 'forced' to 
allow suicide’ available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/norfolk/8284728.stm <accessed 
14/03/2013>.
112 Applicable in England and Wales only, and substantially amended in 2007 under the new Mental 
Health Act.
113 See s.3(2)(a) 1983 Act and 1(2)) 2007 Act for further.
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1983 Act this principle only applies where a person should receive such treatment (and it 
cannot be provided unless they are detained). This can include treatment for ‘symptoms or 
manifestations’ of a disorder, which based on presumption, may include suicidal acts. It has 
been reported that medical professionals found that Wooltorton’s situation rendered her 
ineligible for such compulsory treatment under the MHA 1983, but psychiatrists have 
questioned this determination. Thus, the floodgates remain ajar due to lack of cohesion 
between the two acts when considering those with borderline personality disorders (which, for 
the purpose of assessing capacity, are not automatically excluded s.2(1) MCA 2005). 
Wooltorton’s parents unsuccessfully attempted to sue the Norfolk and Norwich 
University Hospitals Trust on the basis that their daughter was not mentally competent at the 
time of creating the advance refusal at a solicitor’s office as: 
“The coroner reached a clear verdict which established that Kerrie was mentally 
competent, had refused treatment in the full knowledge of the consequences, and died 
as a result… any attempt to treat Kerrie without her consent would have been 
unlawful”.114
In addition, a recent Parliamentary Postnote made comment about the cases’ re-ignition of 
concern over the ‘Euthanasia by Omission’ worries eminent during the birth of the MCA 2005’s 
advance refusal provisions: 
“Although she (Wooltorton) was, at the time of admission, thought to be capable of 
refusing,115 uncertainty has persisted about such refusals where anticipatory decision-
making is involved. The Department of Health viewed the MHA as a possible resolution 
to such legal and clinical difficulties. Under it, anticipatory decision-making does not 
have legal force and adults with the capacity to decide mental health treatment can be 
treated compulsorily”.116
114 The Christian Institute 2009. 
115 This confusion could be quelled if her multiple personality disorder was defined per s.1(2) MHA 2007 
where ‘mental disorder’ means any disorder or disability of the mind.
116Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2011, 3.
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This message seems eclectic. By the NHS Trust, we are told that Wooltorton had the requisite 
levels of capacity to make a decision about her treatment, yet, by the DoH we are guided 
towards Part IV of the MHA on treating people without consent, which only applies to 
treatment for mental disorder (and this does not apply when treating physical disorders unless 
the physical disorder is reasonably linked as a symptom/ underlying cause of a mental 
disorder). If Wooltorton’s personality disorder had been defined as a mental disorder, there 
would have been no question at all under the MCA 2005 – she would have lacked capacity. 
Because of avoidance of issues, the implications for allowing what seems like incidental assisted 
suicide for the able-bodied but mentally unsound (if not incompetent) are worrying. The 
inevitable difficulties of allowing such wide interpretation of this aspect of the Act do not marry 
in with the constrictive current law on assisted suicide, leading one academic, rightly, to pose 
the question:
“When, if ever, does someone with a mental disorder have an equal right to end her life 
to that enjoyed by someone with a physical disorder?”117
Rebecca Smith suggested, following this case, that ss.24 to 26 were used simply for those dying 
of an illness or disease, as to exclude opening up the floodgates to arguments of assisted 
suicide.118 This makes sense when we view the situation from the perspective of the parents of 
Wooltorton:
“Try this: just for a moment, imagine that the police visit your home to tell you that your 
child has committed suicide. Now imagine that they tell you that the ambulance and 
hospital staff could and would have saved her life, but she handed them a letter asking 
them not to”.119
Another pertinent dilemma here is the contrast with the obstinate assisted suicide rules which, 
due to public support, may soon be relaxed; the passage of such movement is in its early stages 
117 Richardson 2013.
118 Smith 2009.
119 Pitcher 2009.
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of development at the time of writing.120 Despite promises of change by the then Health 
Secretary, Andy Burnham, to restrict the advance refusal provisions to declining and ultimately 
terminal illness,121 the advance refusal provisions are still arguably not accommodating the 
correct audience. In addition, although not a personality disorder per se, the MCA 2005 does 
not cover the question of how to treat persons who have made an advance refusal with 
dementia. Plainly, these persons may be the same person, or another person according to the 
stage which their condition reaches. For the purpose of the 2005 Act, if an advance refusal is 
deemed as existing, valid and applicable, we must then delineate whether or not it is relevant 
that a person remains the same throughout their life. The argument for the importance of 
considering the personal identity problem is discussed more substantively in chapter five but it 
is worth mentioning here as this too is a substantial contributor to the questionable ethics of 
the main provisions.
2.5.4 Other Issues
There are also other issues, there is a major problem around alleged practical incompatibility 
with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006. The 
General Assembly Resolution 61/106, Article 12(3) requires that States must:
“Take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the 
support they may require in exercising their legal capacities”
It has been reported in general that the MCA 2005’s s.1 2)-4) requirements of presumption of 
capacity, provision of information and respect, particularly for the mentally disabled, are being 
bypassed by many healthcare professionals. Indeed, one study by the Mental Health 
Foundation exposed that 52% of health and social care professionals assumed that mentally 
and physically disabled service users did not have capacity before conducting health 
assessments.122 This amounts to what Toby Williamson, Head of Development and Later Life at 
Mental Health Foundation, has coined a ‘high and worrying level of misunderstanding’ amongst 
120 Assisted Dying Bill [HL] 2013-2014.
121 Bingham 2009.
122 Pitt 2010.
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such professionals.123 There are other design flaws in the Act per se which have attracted 
negative attention such as the pre-existing ‘Bournewood Gap’124 relating to deprivation of 
liberty safeguards arguably bridged by the Mental Health Act 2007 and other inconsistencies 
with the MHA 1983 (even following the 2007 Act’s input), highlighted in, for example, a 2011 
Parliamentary Postnote:
“The introduction of the MCA 2005 does seem to have made it clearer that a tension 
exists between two legal traditions for substitute decision-making in health: one that is 
based explicitly on the principle of capacity and personal autonomy (now the MCA 
2005) and one that is not (the MHA). The MCA 2005 and the MHA now exist side by side 
and both can apply to the same person. When these two structures meet  – in 
anticipatory decision-making, in deprivation of liberty and in community treatment 
orders – there is evidence of complexity and confusion. Case law is evolving in these 
areas but it is unlikely to provide an easy legal fix”.125
Finally, the burden of proof is on those seeking to establish an advance directive as being 
binding and effective. Thinking about the complexities of a terminal illness when you are in the 
early stages of it is not easy. But thinking of these situations when you are not unwell is more 
difficult unless you are attempting to commit suicide and wish to evade all medical intervention 
(such as in the Wooltorton case). From this, many, from groups such as the Christian Medical 
Fellowship,126 through to journalists and academics such as Pitcher,127 have called for reform  
for the ss.24 to 26 provisions to apply only to those who are terminally ill or dying naturally 
anyway.
123 Quoted in Pitt 2010.
124 See further Allen, N 2010.
125 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2011, 4.
126 Groom 2010.
127 Pitcher 2009.
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2.6 Summary
There are issues highlighted in this chapter that need to be resolved. The common law 
preceding the MCA 2005 contained many anomalies which still resound today. The existing 
problems with the legislation itself have formed what Polly Botsford aptly terms a ‘few 
cracks’.128
The problems still faced by the MCA 2005 are:
1) A lack of integration due to lack of advertising and education about the provisions;
2) A lack of clarity which stems from this lack of information – a problem due to the 
wording and formalities used within the 2005 Act. On top of the formalities of 
signatures and witnesses for advance refusals, there is also a demand for intuitive 
forethought. The patient must specify the treatment rejected and all circumstances 
in the advance refusal (this is not always possible considering the ever-evolving 
advances in healthcare treatment), and must not do anything inconsistent with their 
advance refusal. In any case, the transparency of application is not recorded as 
advance refusals are not centrally documented;
3) Morally unsound aspects of the MCA 2005 where issues such as assisted suicide are 
not considered, along with other issues which are later addressed, such as the 
decision-making capabilities of persons with dementia, and consideration of the 
personal identity problem (at chapter five specifically).  
There are fundamental flaws in the MCA 2005’s main provisions – these issues need to be 
cleaned up before they can be fully implemented. When this is the case, the solutions I would 
propose for the widespread implementation would be:
1) The answer to integration of the MCA 2005 may be better ‘advertising’ of the 
provisions which could spur on wide-spread understanding and advertisement. This 
would need to come by way of a system for educating people about their rights 
128 Botsford 2007.
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under the main provisions of the MCA 2005, as well as a system of registration and 
information aided by medical professionals. As inspiration, there are 19 million 
people on the organ donors register at this moment129 and 4% of the population on 
the blood donors register. For both campaigns you can click ’like’ on Facebook, 
comment on Twitter, etc. Despite the fact that both sorts of donation are in parts, 
morbid, they are successful. There have already been talks of an ‘advance refusal’ 
card which received widespread comment.130
2) Today, persons express themselves orally, through videography, online and through 
other social media means; there are issues around the strict guidelines for 
composing an advance refusal. A suggestion for greater clarity of the formalities 
guiding the creation of advance refusals would be to riddance the internet pro 
formas that have been seen to cause havoc.131 Instead, advance refusals should be 
made after consultation with healthcare professionals, that way, many of the 
formalities, particularly the question of what treatment may be available, will be 
addressed. This process would allow for greater peace of mind of the advance 
decision-maker, as well as the healthcare professional. In addition, the format of the 
advance refusal should be less rigid, and possibly combined with its more widely-
used counterpart, the LPA.132 The LPA for health and welfare mentioned at 2.3 
provides guidance for what appointed attorneys can, and cannot make decisions on 
(such as refusal of life-sustaining treatment without prior consent of the creator of 
the LPA (also known as the ‘donor’)). The donor, or creator of the LPA can only 
specify more particular requirements through wishes in the document which are not 
enforceable. If the LPA for health and welfare was used more proficiently, it could 
provide an answer to the problems faced by using varied internet pro formas.133
129 McGuinness 2013.
130 Bingham 2012.
131 Seen most recently in the case of The X Primary Care Trust v XB [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
132 This approach is taken in California, and succeeds in being widely used; I return to this point in 
chapter 7.
133 For the official template used for an LPA of health and welfare please see the Office of the Public 
Guardian website. The document is accessible here; 
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3) I would suggest that the main provisions are tempered to separately address the 
issues of persons suffering from severe personality disorders, and that these persons 
are treated as incapacitated during periods of personality ‘switch’ – in the same 
manner that we treat persons between periods of lucidity in capacity per s.2(2) of 
the 2005 Act. This would invoke fully the protection mechanisms under the MHA 
1983. The treatment of persons with dementia is an issue which merits separate 
discussion because of the sliding scale of personality disorder that can occur (further 
discussed in chapter five). Those with dementia also need to be considered 
separately under the MCA 2005.
In sum, legislative change is necessary. Unsurprisingly, one national newspaper recently 
revealed the effect of the rigidity of the provisions in their strap line; ‘Half the population would 
make a ‘living will' if it was easy’.134 The message is already underlying that there are matters 
which need to be addressed in the main provisions of the MCA 2005 before they can fully take 
effect. Turning to the next three chapters in this thesis, I now consider the wider ethical 
implications for the advance refusals provisions in the 2005 Act concerning personhood, 
autonomy, the sanctity of life, and personal identity.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/245571/LPA114_Heal
th_welfare_LPA.pdf <accessed 22/12/2013>
134 Alderson 2010.
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CHAPTER THREE: PERSONHOOD, AUTONOMY AND LIFE
3.1 Why Who We Are Matters
The definition of ‘who we are’ holds great significance in the discussion over advance refusals 
at any time, and especially during the transitional period where the factors once defining ‘me’ 
or ‘you’ change. This is largely due to the pre-supposed relationship that we have with the ‘self’ 
and the resulting right to autonomy. 
As set out in the introduction to this thesis, the notion of personhood provides a firm 
grounding for understanding the importance of ascertaining (in as far as possible) the moral 
status of a person. Presently, the advance refusal provisions within the MCA 2005 do not offer 
guidance on understanding the importance of establishing this. To treat patients in line with the 
PGC, firstly an assessment must be made as to their ‘moral status’ hence the exploration of 
personhood in this chapter. Taking this catch-all approach means that incorrect decisions are 
being made about how best to treat people. It is urged that answering the question of ‘who we 
are’ can lead to us addressing questions such as ‘to what extent does this person matter?’ 
Where the law says we all do, the PGC would contend that this could only stretch as far as to 
include agents (ourselves) and ostensible agents (those beings outside ourselves who act like 
agents and must be treated as so; discussed further at 4.3 and 4.4). It follows that without 
attempting to address the issue of ‘does this person matter’ (which is currently the approach of 
the MCA 2005), advance refusals become virtually meaningless, or at least precarious.
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3.2 Life As We Know it
“To live is the rarest thing in the world. Most people exist, that is all”.
― Oscar Wilde
Life as we know it is generally protected by what we have known as the ‘sanctity’ or 
‘inviolability’ of life approach which originates in religion and ethics. The principle revolves 
around the implicit protection of life which is depicted as being sanctified or holy and as holding 
great value. The concept has been entrenched in the ECHR’s universal Article 2(1) ‘Right to life’. 
It was also recognised in the works of Kant:
”To preserve one’s life is a duty, and besides everyone has an immediate inclination to 
do so… The often anxious care that most people take of it still has no inner worth and 
their maxim has no moral content… They look after their lives in conformity with duty 
but not from duty… On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless grief have quite taken 
away the taste for life; if an unfortunate man… more indignant about his fate than 
despondent or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it, 
not from inclination or fear but from duty, then his maxim has moral content”.135
Because the matter of ‘life’ per Article 2 is invoked concerning the treatment of persons where 
an advance refusal is ambiguous, or non-existent, the question of what it is to be ‘living’ is 
important for us to consider so that the preservation of life’s true extent can be reasoned. From 
this, some degree of thought regarding the relationship between ourselves and others becomes 
necessary. This may lead to postulation of the possibility of one existence within ourselves, or, 
in varying forms, multiple existences in multiple locations, or of a single, ulterior existence such 
as that shown in movies akin to ‘The Matrix’136 or ‘Source Code’.137 Thinking in this way allows 
for some degree of assessment of the relationship between a person’s choices and rights, and 
135 Kant, 1785, as translated in Paton, 11.
136 ‘The Matrix’ 1999 (movie; dir., Andy Wachowski).
137 ‘Source Code’ 2011 (movie; dir., Duncan Jones).
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further, the extent that these are interrelated with the choices and rights of others, and the 
treatment of these by the community as a whole. 
3.3 Who Are We to Judge?
For animals, bacteria, plants, and other life forms, the act of ‘life’ also involves all of the simple 
but key components; movement, respiration, sensitivity, growth, reproduction, excretion and 
nutrition (the ‘MRS GREN’ style acronym taught in schools). There are a number of ways to 
define life, this can be achieved biologically, or this can be defined as capable of exercising 
some preferences or values. The important factor here is that we are not talking about ‘life’, we 
are talking about a meaningful life. From this, the way in which we define ‘life’ has extremely 
important implications for the way we are to be treated. Under the PGC, it is not ‘life’ that 
matters, but agency; this holds important consequences for the status of persons because the 
rights of agents differ greatly to the rights of non-agents.138
Conceptually, life is something which humans experience. Yet, theoretically, the act of 
‘being alive’ carries with it a more succinct meaning and in turn, varying degrees of respect. For 
a human, being alive is having the ability to pursue purposes, to retain memories, to feel 
emotions, to act autonomously, cognitively, consciously,139 and with meaning – it is much, 
much more than just the ‘MRS GREN’ style acronym. The value of life for both the person living 
it, and for those looking on, is subjective. 
We may look to our philosophical predecessors to find inspiration about what it is to be 
living if ‘life’ is not obvious. These accounts are varied. Plato’s metaphysical account of the 
person revolved around the ‘Form’ or shadow being beyond ourselves in a dualist existence 
138 See 4.1.1 and 5.3.1-5.3.2 for further discussion of this point.
139 Lord Goff comments on the subject of consciousness (as integral to life) in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.
[1993] A.C. 789 at 868-9 ; ‘[F]or my part I cannot see that medical treatment is appropriate or requisite 
simply to prolong a patient's life, when such treatment has no therapeutic purpose of any kind, as where 
it is futile because the patient is unconscious’.
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with the mind being entrapped in the body.140 Aristotle proposed that the ultimate ‘good’ for 
humans, and the ultimate ‘aim’ of life, would be the maximum realization of the function that 
was unique to humans, with human virtuousness being buried deep in our souls. 141
For some the so-called ‘artificial life’, a simulated version of life created through non-
natural means usually aided by technology, is argued to be changing the face of the definition 
of ‘life’ as we know it. From this view, the certain attributes and functions which were formerly 
thought to be sole defining features of living things can be now be copied which may lead to 
such robots being considered as ethically on a par with their human counterparts. This view 
becomes even more unconventional when we consider that humans may install a number of 
pre-programmed ethical decisions into robots. This would enable the robots to choose their 
own actions, and ‘life’- path, exhibiting a degree of consciousness, which may not be ruled out. 
Thus, for the present purposes, and due to absent technological advances, such ‘robots’ 
can be deemed as non-living. But the area of the life versus ‘non-life’ distinction is a 
fundamental one with very practical consequences. Looking to future possible advances, these 
consequences are amplified when considering the treatment of a human who looks like other 
adult humans, but who breathes through an electrically powered respirator, and eats through a 
force feeding tube, and who has no thought at all whatsoever. The question arising from this 
has been considered at law as well as theoretically; do we class such an entity as a human? The 
view taken by the PGC (where it could be established that a person was not an ostensible 
agent) would be that keeping a person alive by way of artificial means without any hope of 
regaining consciousness is inhumane but that provision of ANH and ventilation to an extent 
could not be automatically ruled out. This outlook was given recognition in the well-known case 
of Tony Bland142 but such an approach is only just and fair where a ‘PVS’ is confirmed which 
entails:
140 See Plato (BCE) as translated in Lee and Lee 2007. See in particular Books III and V for further 
discussion.
141 Aristotle (BCE) Nicomachean Ethics translated by Roger Crisp (Cambridge , Cambridge University 
Press, 2000).
142 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789 at 819 (per Butler-Sloss L.J.).
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“an absence of awareness of one's self and one's environment, a sleep/wake cycle, no 
demonstration of purposeful movement, no experience of suffering and no evidence of 
comprehension. Behaviours are limited to reflexive activities indicating no cortical 
involvement”. 143
In line with this thinking, Constable formulated the view that ‘patients in PVS should have life-
sustaining care withdrawn when their wishes are unknown’, with the exception of; 1) The 
‘families or other surrogates of the patient should be given the last word’; and 2) ‘a reasonable 
effort should be made to know whether the patient has expressed a preference either way’.144
Constable goes on to say that:
“where there is no advance directive, the family should instead be encouraged to 
consider whatever factors that they deem useful, whether it be the patient's expected 
preferences, the family's own views about his best interests, or any other guiding 
principle”.145
Ultimately she decides ‘In the case of PVS, when in doubt as to a patient's wishes, it is better to 
discontinue life-sustaining treatment’.146
Craigie postulates that it is usually considered that decisions around treatment ought to 
be respected because of what she terms their ‘assumed connection to the self’.147 However, 
there are circumstances where selfhood, that is the status of a person, means that such a hard 
and fast rule is not appropriate, particularly when we are addressing the problems faced by 
those with dementia because the connection with the self is difficult to define. There are other 
problems with defining the ‘self’ and understanding the moral status of a person. To illustrate, 
problems have been known to arise when patients have been treated as being in a PVS, but 
were locked-in. This is now less known considering advancements in a variety of brain-scanning 
143 The NHS Trust v AW (by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) [2013] EWHC 78 (COP), at 16 (per 
Jackson, J.).
144 Constable 2012, 163.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid 163 to 164 for this conclusion. 
147 Craigie 2013,16.
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mechanisms designed to detect neural activity so defining the brain-states of persons. It is 
difficult to imagine the frustration of such patients who have been, and remain, undiagnosed or 
misdiagnosed such as Canadian Scott Routley who, until last year, was believed to have been in 
a PVS for 12 years following a car crash.  He was actually locked-in. This point becomes more 
poignant considering that Scott’s family maintain that he could communicate with them using 
his eyelids and his thumb, for all that time but the treating healthcare professionals dismissed 
this.148
When applying the main provisions of the MCA 2005, the PGC requires, at the outset, an 
assessment as to a person’s ‘moral status’.  It is hoped that this chapter has given grounding to 
show that for the MCA 2005 to give effect to any kind of advance refusal, it must first 
distinguish between different levels of moral status practically, and where practicable. Where 
an advance refusal has been made this should be preserved where possible, and at least 
considered, even where formalities fall short. The MCA 2005 does not allow for this. The 
principle’s most recent criticisable application has forced ‘life’ on two women who arguably did 
not want it; one was in a minimally conscious state149 (herein ‘MCS’; a state of consciousness 
just above that of PVS), and the other was receiving end stage palliative care for anorexia 
nervosa.150 This leads us into an argument which favours first-person autonomy where legally 
recognisable capacity is present and/or as it is argued in this thesis (where appropriate) task-
specific competence is demonstrated. 
148 See Walsh, 2012.
149 Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287.
150 A Local Authority v E (2012) EWHC 1639 (COP).
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CHAPTER FOUR: BETWEEN AUTONOMY v THE RIGHT TO LIFE: LESSONS FROM THE X PRIMARY 
CARE TRUST V XB151
4.1 Competence, Autonomy and Agency
As early as 1914 Justice Cardozo viewed the primacy of autonomy as the right of 'every human 
being of adult years and sound mind … to determine what shall be done with his own body'.152
The word autonomous is taken from the Greek word ‘autonomos’. From this definition, to be 
autonomous is literally to live under one's own laws. This is a freedom codified in Article 8 
ECHR. 
As opined by Samanta and Samanta, autonomy is ‘the bedrock of medical law’.153 The 
importance of autonomy resounds in the philosophy of Gewirth where morality itself rests on 
the notion of freedom of action, with which freewill and autonomy are the basis of all action. 
The GR all have waivable benefits as others owe duties, but these duties can be released 
through autonomous decisions. The alternative is that a person’s autonomous actions and 
thoughts are guided (in various ways) by pre-determinism. This is the view that our actions are 
heavily influenced due to cultural, social, geographical, and other reasons; an approach 
championed by soft-determinists such as John Locke.154 More radically, hard determinists claim 
that no action or thought is autonomous. Resulting from this view, morality is not even applied 
subjectively, even the concept of morality becomes elusive. This is because a person’s actions, 
for better or worse, may not carry any level of accountability. 
The danger of buying into a ‘predetermined’ ethical construct is well illustrated in the 
defence prepared by the famous US attorney Clarence Darrow in the 1924 murder case of The 
151 The X Primary Care Trust v XB [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
152 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital (1914) 211 NY 125 at 129.
153 Samanta and Samanta 2013 , 690.
154 John Locke quoted in  E. J. Lowe 1986, 149. 
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State of Illinois v. Leopold & Loeb.155 The defendant murder suspects were two educated young 
adults, described as ‘rich and blood-thirsty’, and the victim, 14 year old Bobby Franks. In a 
reportedly 12 hour long statement, the basis of Darrow's plight was founded on his strong 
belief that the biological and sociological influences the young men had undergone caused the 
crime, and not the suspects themselves. The argument rested on the notion that the young 
men’s immoral choice, and action, was out of their hands:
“If there is a responsibility anywhere, it is back of him; somewhere in the infinite 
number of his ancestors, or in his surroundings, or in both. And I submit, Your Honour, 
that under every principle of conscience, or right, and of law, he should not be made 
responsible for the acts of someone else”.156
Indeed, if the actions of human beings were completely predetermined, in line with Darrow’s 
thinking, one main contention would be that human life, and the sociological systems we have 
in place as we know them, would be replaced with lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy. The 
other side of the coin outlines that we have complete ‘freewill’ and free thought and choice to 
create our own destiny autonomously, with complete self-actualization as the ultimate goal in 
the same manner outlined by Maslow.157
4.1.1 The Relevance of Gewirth’s Agent Autonomy
The problem of determinism is addressed in the PGC through the concept of agency. Agents are 
autonomous, and pursue their own purposes freely. Indeed, without autonomy, agency is not 
155 The State of Illinois v. Leopold & Loeb 1924 (USA) See further; Newman, Stephen A. 2000. "Leopold 
and Loeb." 223 New York Law Journal (February 16), 2.
156 Darrow, L and L (1924) at line 2030. The defendant’s pending death sentence was quashed and 
replaced with 99 years behind bars. After assessment of the case transcript, it would appear that whilst 
the defence presented by Darrow secured mitigating results, this was not because of the conviction of 
argument, but because his philosophical views at the time were considered to render him a member of 
the educational elite; this, informally speaking, led to his running rings around the prosecution and 
judiciary who were sitting. Please see case transcript (particularly for quote at p.55) through this link; 
http://darrow.law.umn.edu/documents/Leopold_Loeb_Darrow_Crowe_arguments.pdf at as  published 
by Wilson Publishing Co. (undated) (Chicago:USA)  <accessed 09/12/2013>
157 Maslow, A. H. 1943, 382.
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possible. Gewirth’s theory does not allow for any doubt about where actions come from; they 
come from agents, and each agent is responsible for pursuing their own goals and values.
Importantly, agency under the PGC has many advantages. The PGC allows for 
contemporaneous decisions as well as refusals. In the same manner that contemporaneous 
decisions are allowed, future, advance decisions are also considered appropriate. From this, if I 
can refuse treatment now, I can refuse treatment later. More importantly, I can refuse now to 
refuse to be treated later:
a) I am an agent, I have decision-making abilities and I am autonomous;
b) I can make decisions here and now (contemporaneous);
c) I can also make decisions about my future in the event that I later do not have 
decision-making capacity;
d) Moreover, agents may choose to release others from all of their duties to them, 
encouraging positive intervention where accepted by the rights-subject.158 This notion 
shares values akin to what Samanta and Samanta term ‘holistic determination for 
oneself’159 and includes the right to heteronomy, autonomy and any other 
considerations as part of the advance decision-making process. Referring back to 
Beyleveld,160 it would not be inconsistent with the PGC for the notion of autonomy to be 
extended to include other considerations where rights conflict. The only problem with 
this in practice, and left unexplored by Samanta and Samanta, is the that such decisions 
,unless properly executed, may amount to being written off due to undue influence. This 
is especially the case remembering that, prima facie, medical professionals determine 
outcomes where advance decisions are ambiguous and most of these professionals 
want to maintain their livelihood,161 also ; 
e) Because defining agency is not always clear-cut, especially in cases of those with 
dementia, the PGC points towards a view that the validity of advance refusals would rely 
158 Beyleveld 2012, 14.
159 See Samanta and Samanta 2013, 719. 
160 Beyleveld 2012.
161 I explore the notion of balancing competing interests of others in the penultimate chapter.
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upon whether there were issues around personal identity. Pattinson’s task-specific 
competence model becomes relevant here.162 The model is task-specific as the 
difference between being able to read a book differs greatly from being able to refuse a 
life-saving blood transfusion. This ‘building block’ approach becomes particularly helpful 
when exploring further the main issues at the heart of any confusion over autonomy in 
advance refusals which are;
1) How sure can we be that it was this person’s decision?
2) Is it the same person making the decision?  
The MCA either ignores the personal identity problem or assumes it is valid. However, it does, 
to an extent, address question 1 through urging evidence-gathering of written statements 
detailing what the person would have wanted (MCA 2005 s.4(6)(a) to (c)). Yet no attempt has 
been made to set out guidelines relating to question 2 and such issues stemming from 
dementia have never been dealt with at court. The problems presented as a result are 
elucidated further in chapter five.
4.2 Autonomy v Life: Ameliorating the Grand Illusion
In 2005, Sabine Michalowski forewarned that the MCA 2005 could emulate the common law 
trend of bias towards the sanctity of life.163 Despite codification that advance refusals are to be 
treated with as much respect as contemporaneous refusals, this presentiment has since been 
authenticated. 
In Re M, 164 the mother of a 52 year old woman sought authorization for the withdrawal 
of ANH and ventilation from her daughter in a MCS. MCS was here described by Baker, J. as:
“involving signiﬁcant (sic) limitations on consciousness with a quality of life that many 
would find impossible to accept were they able to consistently express themselves with 
full competence”.165
162 See Pattinson 2002a, 78 and Pattinson 2011, 148 and 150.
163 See Michalowski 2005, 958- 959.
164 Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287.
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The application was made on this ‘low quality of life’ basis. In addition, there was evidence to 
suggest M’s former wishes and feelings indicated that she would want this. Considered per the 
court’s obligation (s.4 MCA 2005), three separate witnesses described M’s advance wishes as a 
fiercely independent woman. All witnesses recounted her fervent desire to have her life ended 
if she became dependent like Tony Bland in the media, and similar to her late father and 
grandmother who had also ended up in a PVS. Despite recognition that M’s life consisted of 
pain and suffering which would not be ameliorated until death, Baker, J. dismissed any
statements made by M as informal166 and refused to sanction the withdrawal of ANH. After 
adopting the same ‘balance sheet approach’ that Thorpe, LJ. did in Re A (Mental Patient: 
Sterilisation),167 weighing up the positive aspects of withdrawal versus continuing ANH, Baker, J. 
held that M:
“will be kept alive for ten years. The preservation of life is a fundamental principle… She 
will continue to experience life as a sensate being with a degree of awareness of herself 
and her environment”.168
The lack of recognition of M’s past wishes and feelings, coupled with the overbearing 
application in favour of life where life is almost non-existent, leads down a dark, draconian 
path. If the law is taken at face value, it is inhumane and undignified.  As opined by Alexandra 
Mullock:
“where there is good reason to doubt that a person has a reasonable quality of life, 
together with clear evidence that the person would not choose life if they were able to 
communicate, sanctity of life concerns should not overshadow the other factors”.169
M did not create a valid and applicable advance refusal. As such, ignoring her previous wishes 
and feelings (the only link to the generic rights she exercised as an ostensible agent concerning 
165 Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287 at 34.
166 Re M ; EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287, at 6, 83-85 and 250.
167 Ibid. [2000] F.L.R. 549; [2000] 1 F.C.R. 193 CA (Civ Div).
168 Re M [2011] ; EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287, at 248.
169 Mullock 2012 at 470.
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this matter), although inexcusable, was not unjustified. A Local Authority v E170 concerned E, a 
32 year old woman, who, after a lifetime of struggling with anorexia nervosa to the point of 
attracting palliative care, created an advance refusal. For the purposes of the MCA 2005, this 
advance refusal was ‘valid and applicable’ – complete with two signatures, a witness signature, 
and a verification of her legal capacity at the time (as conceded by a mental health advocate). 
Indeed E was so desperate to ensure compliance with her advance refusal, she followed the 
required steps meticulously.171
Before she had written this advance refusal, she was, at several points during the two 
year period previously, viewed as having the legal and mental capacity to make one to this 
effect. But, on the same day that the advance refusal was eventually created, E was detained 
under s.3 of the MHA 1983 and the day after that she was admitted to an eating disorder unit. 
On the issue of capacity Jackson, J. found, beyond doubt, that E’s anorexia itself 
rendered her incapacitated172 and amounted to ‘an impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
functioning of, the mind or brain’ per s. 2(1) MCA 2005. There were two reasons given as to 
why E lacked the capacity for this advance refusal to be deemed valid:
1) E's fear of weight gain rendered her incapable of ‘weighing the advantages and 
disadvantages of eating in any meaningful way’. The meagre example used to illustrate 
this lack of judgment was when E cried in August 2011, when the question of weight 
gain and the achievement of a Body Mass Index of 16 was mentioned to her by her 
clinician;173 and,
2) E, being prescribed sedative medication was considered as being in a ‘severely 
weakened condition…’a drug haze’.174
170 Ibid EWHC 1639 (COP); 2 F.C.R. 523, 2012.
171 E even went to the length of including the provision (evading the quagmire of s.25) that; ’If I exhibit 
behaviour seemingly contrary to this advanced directive this should not be viewed as a change of 
decision.’ This clause, pursuant to s.25 of the 2005 Act, was rejected.
172 [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) at 48.
173 [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) at 49.
174 [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) at 50.
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Contrastingly, it was accepted that E could understand and retain the information 
relevant to the treatment decision and, communicate her decision (demonstrative of partially 
satisfying the definition of capacity and of having task-specific competence). The decision of 
Jackson, J. recognised that E’s family, many of her former clinicians, and E herself, agreed with E 
following a palliative care plan.  Despite this, due to the misplaced use of intuition,175 the 
balancing exercise was tipped in favour of life: 
“Against them, I place E's life in the other scale. We only live once – we are born once 
and we die once – and the difference between life and death is the biggest difference 
we know. E is a special person, whose life is of value. She does not see it that way now, 
but she may in future”.176
In this case, no issues of personal identity arose. Combining the general rules of the PGC 
with task-specific competence, the elements of irrationality shown in emotion over weight gain 
must be assessed as against E’s weighing and understanding the consequences of rejection of 
treatment. Application of the PGC would not advocate such a sanctimonious ascription of 
‘value’ on E’s life outside of E’s own assessment, avoiding the ‘slippery slope’ of subjective 
judgments arising from the few advance refusal cases which are reported each year.
Despite the trend discussed, there has been some deviation from the approach in favour 
of Article 2 in the cases of The X Primary Care Trust v XB177 and NHS Trust Authority v L,178which 
show promise. The X Primary Care Trust v XB179 concerned an application made to the court as 
to the validity of an advance refusal. XB, a 66 year old, had suffered from MND for over a 
decade, eight years of which he spent breathing using a ventilation device attached to his 
windpipe and gaining sustenance through ANH. Through communicating with his eyes, with his 
wife as witness and using an internet pro forma template, he created an advance refusal. XB 
knew about the pathway of regression his illness would entail, so the life-prolonging treatment 
175 Ibid [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) at 129. Jackson, J. ‘The balancing exercise is not mechanistic but 
intuitive and there are weighty factors on each side of the scales’.
176 Ibid [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) at 137.
177 Ibid [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
178 Ibid [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP).
179 Ibid [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
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was specified, and the advance refusal was to apply at the point where he lost the ability to
communicate. The issue to be resolved with the advance refusal was whether or not the 
included ‘date of review’ and ‘valid until’ date (ending the day following the hearing), could 
amount to dissolution of the refusal.180 Relying on witnesses to the case, Theis, J. approached
this in a practical way with a declaration that the advance refusal was not ‘time-limited’ and 
gave direction for future cases that ‘there is no set form for advance refusals’ referring to the 
Mental Capacity Code of Practice as mere guidance for what should be included.181 An opposing 
outcome would have ensued if the MCA 2005 main provisions were applied literally: the 
included ‘end-date’ may have been treated as rendering the advance refusal non-existent or 
non-valid in line with (s.26(4)(a)/(b)) and, witness accounts, although considered as part of XB’s 
wishes and feelings, could have been replaced with the conferred ‘best interests’ test i.e. what 
the sitting judge deems fit at that time. In fact, MCA 2005’s main provisions were not elided; 
and the judgment itself became an obstacle course which included the hurdles, but was not 
defeated by them. 
The outcome of The X Primary Care Trust v XB182 demonstrates that judicial discretion 
can accommodate and respect both the main provisions and the spirit of the MCA 2005 in 
juxtaposition.  This application of the law in XB would be consistent with rights conferred under 
the PGC – such preservation of autonomy in this case amounts to a welcome decision, as 
summarised by Foster:
“The care with which the court examined the validity and applicability of the advance 
refusal should give some comfort to those who worry that advance refusals will be 
waved blithely and followed with slavish and deadly literalism”.183
The more recent outcome of NHS Trust v L184 builds on the approach taken in The X Primary 
Care Trust v XB185 and serves as direct contrast to the ruling in the case of E. L, also a critically ill 
180 Ibid at 26.
181 Ibid at 34.
182 The X Primary Care Trust v XB [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
183 Foster, 2012.
184 [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP).
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adult sufferer of anorexia nervosa, did not create an advance refusal. The NHS trust caring for L 
sought a declaration that it was not in L’s best interests to be forcibly fed, or given any other 
such medical treatment, even where it would result in her death. L accepted sustenance 
through a naso-gastric tube, but only at a rate that would not allow her to gain any weight. 
Whilst she did not want to die, she would not intake the extra calories needed to survive, 
resulting in end stage organ damage.
The court heard compelling medical evidence that if L was to be forcibly fed, she would 
have to be sedated which due to her fragile state, would undoubtedly result in her death. 
Having determined that L did not have the requisite capacity to make decisions about her 
treatment for the same reasons laid down in the above case of E, the court applied the best 
interests test laid down in s.4 MCA 2005. Pursuant to this, L’s best interests were assessed by 
reference to all the circumstances, including that she would not regain capacity in the future 
due to the nature of her anorexia s.4(2) and (3). Other requirements of the test are to 
encourage L to participate as fully as possible in the decision, and to consider the past wishes, 
values, views and beliefs of both L and those of her family (s.4(4) and (6)). The application of 
the test in this case resulted in King, J. carrying out the balancing exercise between life and 
autonomy, adopting the same approach as Lord Goff in Bland, which explicated that whilst the 
preservation of life is a primary aim, it is not absolute.186There was no consideration as to 
whether or not L’s desire to live could amount to a viable ‘advance request’ even if it could be 
established that she had capacity. The interesting matter was that at that same time at which L 
communicated her hopes of survival, she was competent enough to understand the 
consequences of her actions. Therefore it follows that when L rejected the higher caloric intake, 
and this was honoured, it was considered she did have capacity to make her own decisions, and 
she chose to reject life. This path was reconstructed for her as such a route would have been 
painful, degrading and inhumane in line with the judgment in A Local Authority v E187 and 
positively, the decision was made according to E’s wishes by way of her continued conduct 
185 The X Primary Care Trust v XB [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
186 A point also reiterated in the Code of Practice: DoCA 2007, 79.
187 A Local Authority v E [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) at 129.
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which, consumed by illness, did not reflect the will to live a long, healthy life. Again, this would 
be a welcome decision under the PGC’s guidelines. 
4.2.1 The Choice of Death
As a closely related and highly current topic, it is worth mentioning that the amount of 
autonomy allowed in death is minimal. The act of withholding life-prolonging or life-sustaining 
treatment is not itself classed as illegal in England and Wales.188The act of aiding someone to 
administer life curtailing or terminating treatment is. 189This equation is puzzling because the 
end aim is the same yet the modality taken to get there is very different – one may be long and 
drawn out, the other may be dignified, quick and humanitarian.  Whilst this thesis does not 
concentrate on the area of ‘assisted dying’ or euthanasia per se, some degree of exploration of 
this topic is necessary; if the MCA 2005’s promulgation of first-person autonomy as the primary 
right were truly justified, this would govern the application of the right to life, carrying with it 
the right to choose one’s purposes freely, including the right to die. Under the current law of 
England and Wales assisting a person to die is not lawful, by anyone.
In 2012, locked-in syndrome sufferers Tony Nicklinson and an anonymous man named 
‘Martin’ sought to alter the unkindness of the law through vividly outlining their own 
circumstances.190 Martin wished to die by assisted suicide, by visiting Dignitas in Switzerland. 
The main declaration sought by Martin was to the effect that the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (herein ‘DPP’) needed to clarify his published policy191 so that the healthcare 
profession and others, willing to assist Martin in his desire to commit suicide, would know more 
clearly their position and whether or not they could be prosecuted. The latest decision in this 
case (Court of Appeal) was successful but has since been appealed by the DPP to the Supreme 
188 See for e.g. judgment in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789. particularly at paras.822- 835.
189 Codified in s.2(1)The Suicide Act 1961.
190 R. (on the application of Jane Nicklinson) and Lamb v Ministry of Justice; R (on the application of AM) 
v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] EWCA Civ 961.
191 Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide Director of Public 
Prosecutions Feb 2010, CPS available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html <accessed 08/12/2013>
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Court. If Martin succeeds in his claim against the DPP, he also seeks declarations that there will 
be no risk of prosecution or disciplinary proceedings in relation to all solicitors (i.e. through the 
Solicitors Regulation Authority) and doctors (through the General Medical Council) who aid in 
making the journey to Dignitas possible. This matter is ongoing in the Supreme Court192 at the 
time of writing.
In the 2012 case, Tony Nicklinson set forth his and absolute desire to emancipate 
himself from a life he did not wish to live through seeking three declarations, namely:
“I) A declaration that it would not be unlawful, on the grounds of necessity, for Mr 
Nicklinson's GP, or another doctor, to terminate or assist the termination of Mr 
Nicklinson's life;
ii) further or alternatively, a declaration that the current law of murder and/or of 
assisted suicide is incompatible with Mr Nicklinson's right to respect for private life 
under Article 8 , contrary to ss.1 and 6 Human Rights Act 1998 , in so far as it 
criminalises voluntary active euthanasia and/or assisted suicide; and,
iii) further or alternatively, a declaration that existing domestic law and practice fail 
adequately to regulate the practice of active euthanasia (both voluntary and 
involuntary), in breach of Article 2”.193
Nicklinson’s desired declarations echoed those also sought (unsuccessfully) by Deborah 
Purdy194 three years earlier regarding the matter that the law relating to assisted suicide/ 
murder was incompatible with his right to respect for private life under the art.8 ECHR. It was 
held that the legal prohibition on providing assistance to those wishing to die was not a 
disproportionate interference with art.8 after some consideration of pertinent cases preceding 
192 In this case has shown agreement that the DPP guidelines and the factors to be considered when 
deciding whether to prosecute such cases are insufficiently clear in relation to healthcare professionals 
which does fall foul of meeting the art.8 requirements R. (on the application of Tony Nicklinson) v 
Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 961.
193 Tony Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 304 (QB); Para 5.
194 R. (on the application of Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45; [2010] 1 A.C. 345; [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403; [2009] 
4 All E.R. 1147.
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this one.195His case was guided towards scrutiny under legislative review, and was rejected by 
the sitting judges.196 Additionally, the court refused to create a defence of necessity to a charge 
of murder or assisting suicide. Tony Nicklinson died just six days after this judgment was 
handed down.
Following his death, Tony’s case has since been carried on by his wife, Jane, and two 
other appellants, Martin and Mr Lamb197 who were most recently heard together at the 
Supreme Court in the latter part of 2013. Jane Nicklinson and Paul Lamb have sought (jointly) a 
declaration that the prohibition on assisted suicide per the Suicide Act 1961 is not consistent 
with the right to respect for private and family life under art.8 EHCR. Mr Lamb, 58, is paralysed 
from the neck down following a car accident over two decades ago. He has sought the same 
declaration as Tony Nicklinson, that, under certain conditions, necessity should be a defence to 
the criminal charge of euthanasia and assisted suicide. 
Separately, Martin, in addition to his desire for clarification on the DPP’s policy on the 
process of prosecution for those committing the offences of euthanasia and assisted suicide, 
has also argued that existing domestic law and practice has failed to regulate the practice of 
euthanasia in general. He submits that this amounts to a breach of art.2 ECHR and also that the 
legal prohibition of assisted suicide overall constitutes a disproportionate interference with 
art.8 ECHR. 
The Supreme Court will deliver a ruling in 2014 on the above two cases (to be heard 
together). We must wait with baited breath for what will hopefully be a landmark decision in 
this area. In addition, a Bill concerning similar issues is currently being considered by Parliament 
entitled ‘The Assisted Dying Bill’.198
195 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45, [2010] 1 AC 345 para 101-115 and Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 
35 EHRR 1 considered at para 96-100.
196 R. (on the Application of Tony Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381 (Admin), 2012 WL 
3491755 para 150.
197 In Nicklinson V Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 961; [2013] H.R.L.R. 36; (2013) 16 C.C.L. Rep. 413; 
(2013) 133 B.M.L.R. 46; and also in and also in R (on the application of Jane Nicklinson) and Lamb v 
Ministry of Justice; R (on the application of AM) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] EWCA Civ 961.
198 Assisted Dying Bill [HL] 2013. 
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The future may bring hope for those fighting for the right to autonomy in life, as well as 
in death. Speculatively this also leads to the question as to whether or not there could be a 
place in future for the provision of an assisted dying wish per an advance refusal. For all who 
believe in an overarching supreme principle of morality it must be difficult to understand the 
reasoning behind the judicial decision to keep Nicklinson alive via means of ANH and ventilation 
which seemed to revolve around any decision in court being a matter for Parliament. Some 
would consider this evasion of the issues. As such, there is urgent call for clarification, and 
change, in the law regarding assisted suicide.199
4.3 The Goodness of an Act: Why Agents can Choose How They Live, and Die
For those who are locked-in agents, competency is presumed when expressing 
voluntariness of freedom of action in alternative ways such as blinking and using computerised 
aids as it would be presumed in any ‘fully functioning’ agent. This is not a problem. There are, 
however, possible problems of implementing an advance refusal where the creator is still able 
to exhibit the GR, but is not able to fulfil these alone due to physical impairments. To answer 
this problem, in addition to the requirement of considering other-regarding agents as being 
positive rights-interveners where invited, the ‘goodness’ of an action may also be called into 
question:
“first, he should regard as good those aspects of his wellbeing that are proximate 
necessary preconditions of his performance of any and all of his decisions. Second, he 
regards it as good that his level of purpose fulfilment not be lowered by his losing 
something that seems to him to be good. Third, he regards it as good that his level of 
purpose fulfilment be raised by his gaining of something that seems to be good, namely 
the goal or objective for which he acts”.200
199 For more information on the progress of this Bill please see http://www.appg-
endoflifechoice.org.uk/pdf/appg-safeguarding-choice.pdf <accessed 11/11/2013>
200 Gewirth, 1978 233-234.
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The degree of ‘goodness’ of an action is instrumental; by this, the GR would be viewed not as 
ends in themselves, but as means to pursuing and defending the means to one’s desired end. In 
this sense, there is no assumption that agents ‘ought’ to value’: If an agent chooses a purpose, 
they must take necessary steps contingent with this purpose, and they need to have/ do certain 
things to achieve this. There could be no onerous requirement on the forfeiting of one agent’s 
GR as against another, unless this produced the positive, desired effect. So to kill, or want to 
kill, oneself is not inconsistent with the GCA when we talk about goodness. However the actual 
act of choosing to pursue a cause, and to attach a value, renders this attachable value simply a 
subsisting value, not an instrumental value. So, it is viewed that Gewirthian agents may pursue 
any objective whatsoever within their remit of agency, even if this becomes the rejection of life 
completely. These purposes are particular to such an agent and are what they do when 
exercising their GR. One’s total autonomy rests with the being which was at one point 
autonomous. In this sense, the generic rights can be termed ‘waivable’ benefits. Of course 
asking another agent to interfere positively may be done, but any other agent may reject such a 
positive interference with another’s rights as being a negative right of their own.201 Agents (in 
this example an agent ‘(Y)’) may decide through their generic freedom of action which route is 
best to take for example:
“my killing x is good for x. This is because carrying out an act leading to the inevitable 
death of x (such as withdrawing AHN) is the purpose which x wishes to pursue as an 
agent; or,
“my not killing x is not an act which I will pursue as it is my generic right to pursue only 
those acts concurrent with my rights of agency, and the purposes I wish to pursue, and 
this act is not something I wish to pursue therefore carrying it out cannot be expected of 
me”202
201 Deryck Beyleveld developed this concept and discusses this in more detail in Human Rights article see 
Beyelveld 2012.
202 The idea for this concept came from the lectures delivered by Deryck Beyleveld in 2008/2009 (as part 
of the Law and Medicine module of the Law (LLB) course at Durham University).
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From this, we cannot ‘force’ or require anything of Y excepting that Y does not interfere 
negatively with x’s rights. In this sense, the execution of a person’s advance directive or in 
assisted dying, the same principles would apply when looking at the role of a clinician and their 
patient. In a similar vein to the current law concerning abortion, doctors would be able to 
choose this path at will.
The s.24 (MCA 2005) provisions state that any refusal may not be motivated by the 
desire to bring about death, quoted by Mrs. Justice Eleanor King in NHS Trust Authority v L203:
“In carrying out the balancing exercise I bear in mind that our law contains a strong 
presumption that all steps will be taken to preserve life save in exceptional 
circumstances, this is reflected in Article 2 EHCR”.204
This led to opinion that:
“there comes a point in the treatment of any patient where, regardless of the diagnosis, 
the slavish pursuit of life at any cost becomes unconscionable. I believe, sadly, that this 
point has been reached in Ms L's treatment”.205
The same view has been amplified in the MCA 2005 Code of Practice (para.5.31):
“All reasonable steps which are in a person's best interests should be taken to prolong 
their life. There will be a limited number of cases where treatment is futile, overly 
burdensome to the patient or where there is no prospect of recovery”206
In this case, the court approved a declaration that it was not in the best interests of a person 
suffering from the latter stages of anorexia nervosa, where her body was shutting down after a 
16 year battle, to be the subject of forcible feeding or medical treatment notwithstanding that 
in the absence of such nutrition and treatment she would inevitably die. As seen in this brief 
203 NHS Trust v L; EWHC 2741 (COP) (2012).
204 Ibid at 66.
205 Ibid at 67.
206 See the Code of Practice: DoCA 2007, 79.
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overview regarding the law’s stance on assisted dying, the rights we are granted in life do not 
entirely extend to the way in which we die but this is very much a work in progress.207
4.4 Restoring Balance
In terms of the right to life, this does not yet stretch to the right to death, but there is hope that 
the right to autonomy will prevail and that art.2 will be balanced by a similar provision for those 
wishing to end their lives in certain circumstances with assistance. 
The divergence between the cases of L and of E208 above is startling. Both L and E were 
in the palliative care aftermath of long term anorexia and treated as incompetent, yet L wished 
to live but it was decided that she would not be the subject of all possible life-sustaining 
treatments, and E was to be the subject of such life-sustaining treatment, despite vehemently 
rejecting this by way of an arguably valid advance refusal. The notion of first-person autonomy 
is integral to what constitutes us as conscious, self-driven, decision-making beings; these are 
also key attributes of Gewirthian agents. Without the right to autonomy, we would have little 
or no individual identity. So it is paramount that first-person autonomy is accorded respect. 
Decisions at common law both preceding and following the creation of the MCA 2005 
have amounted to an array of mixed messages. Thus, the grand illusion of the ‘autonomy as 
king’ premise emanating from ss.24 to 26 MCA 2005 forms no compelling magic trick. The main 
provisions of the 2005 Act attribute the utmost importance to autonomy, yet in reality, it is well 
documented that this right is still a relative featherweight as against its brawny competitor 
which seeks always to preserve life.  Despite some positive advances, especially in the case of 
The X Primary Care Trust v XB,209 there is little or no consistency in application of the main 
provisions supported by contrasting the cases of A Local Authority v E210and NHS Trust v L.211
207 Assisted Dying Bill [HL] 2013.
208 A Local Authority v E; EWHC 1639 (COP); 2 F.C.R. 523, 2012.
209 The X Primary Care Trust v XB [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
210 A Local Authority v E [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) at 129.
211 NHS Trust v L [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP).
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The question then follows, why are the provisions producing such a concoction of results? 
Among other reasons, the provisions are not strong enough because they do not consider 
deeper issues, let alone address these.
CHAPTER FIVE: CAN IGNORING THE PERSONAL IDENTITY PROBLEM BE JUSTIFIED?
5.1 Personal Identity and Dementia
It is well documented212 that the nature and importance of personal identity is subject to a 
wide scope of debate and is an unavoidable area of consideration for policy on advance refusals 
of any kind. Disappointingly, under the MCA 2005, there is no separate regulation for patients 
who suffer from dementia, indeed those suffering from dementia are viewed in exactly the 
same way as all other patients who lack capacity. Again, Pattinson’s task-specific competence is 
relevant. Whilst a person who suffers from dementia may not have capacity to refuse ANH, 
they may have a level of competence, allowing them to make certain decisions about their 
lives. When such decisions coincide with former wishes, values, views and beliefs exhibited by a 
person, this builds up a strong picture of what they may desire now in respect of the more 
complex decisions they are unable to make. In the absence of such consideration, the MCA 
2005 prescribes that if the patient had the requisite capacity, and the other criteria are 
satisfied, an advance refusal remains in existence and is valid. Yet, there are in fact two 
diametrically opposed alternative routes. The first; the dementia patient is now a separate 
person from the original creator of the advance refusal, rendering it invalid and inapplicable. 
The second; the advance refusal remains applicable because at the time of creating it, the 
patient had the requisite levels of (legally recognised) capacity and that the wishes they created 
when they were able to do so take precedence over any new decisions made without capacity. 
The MCA 2005 does not consider the ‘sliding scale’ of dementia and the effect that such a 
condition has on personal identity – this chapter seeks to prove that such consideration can no 
212 See for e.g. Buchanan 1988, 279-281 and Parfit 1984, 282- 302.
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longer be avoided. In setting aside discussion of differing thought camps around freewill and 
determinism in the last, this chapter focuses more on the issue of personal identity per se as 
the foundation for autonomy, and autonomy is a prerequisite of agency. Beauchamp 
summarises this approach: 
“if discussions of freedom could be grounded in a clearer view of the nature of persons 
rather than in abstractions like ‘freewill’ and ‘determinism’, they might avoid some of 
the fruitless controversies and ideological distortions that have plagued them in the 
past”.213
5.2 A Legislative Obligation to Consider the Personal Identity Problem?
The main provisions in ss.24 to 26 of the MCA 2005 explicitly apply to ‘P’ as the person making 
an advance refusal. But how do we know that P is still P when an act or event renders P, in any 
degree, physically or psychologically ‘different’?
The ‘personal identity problem’ is an exploration of the issue of providing conclusive 
criteria for evidence of the continued existence of a human being. The debate shows that 
defining ‘who I am’ in relation to my past, future and present self, is not easily answerable. For 
some, attributes such as physicality214 and personality define us. For others, the ongoing person 
is defined in the ability to; recall memories, make autonomous decisions, forge and maintain 
relationships with others, have personal preferences, values, beliefs and habits. These 
attributes can define us as being a person; but the personal identity problem relates to whether 
or not a person can be either the same or, a continuously different person. To demonstrate the 
difficulties presented in this problem, imagine an experiment in which the memories, values, 
habits and beliefs of two separate people are swapped as in the classic film ‘Freaky Friday’215
where a mother and daughter traded bodies. In this scenario, the two people exchange all 
physical attributes, except their psychological self remains. Any close relationships in this 
213 Beauchamp 1999, 281.
214 Buchanan 1988,  279.
215 ‘Freaky Friday’ 1976 (movie; dir., Gary Nelson). 
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scenario would realise that the obtuse, rapid changes within such a person could render them 
‘different’. But when would these to people cease, if at all, being their former selves?
Historically, the debate has been vigorously divided as between those who argue that 
personal identity is established by physical continuity and those who opt instead 
for psychological continuity.
One line of thinking which details reasoning as to why personal identity is not, as he 
describes, ‘of importance’, is Derek Parfit.216 His line of thought follows a ‘no-self’ concept of 
the individual. For Parfit, identity involves ‘Relation R’ — a type of psychological continuity-
where a person is an endless continuum of psychological experiences or events. From this, on 
his account, because of the constant changes in a person rendering them an evolutionary 
process of change, advance refusals cold not hold any force. At the very least, a person is not 
the same person they were due to loss of capacity/ autonomy, and in the extremities, a person 
is not the same person they were due to constancy in time and space.217
Alan Buchanan’s argument sets out a view, with the basis of consciousness as the linking 
matter, that there are certain characteristics which lead to questioning a person’s identity. 
From this perspective, where there is no degree of psychological continuity whatsoever in a 
person (i.e. in a person with acute dementia), there is an argument that an advance refusal 
could not stand due to a ‘switch’ in person. Comparably, Derek Parfit’s version of this argument 
is more extreme; in his estimation, a person is not the same person they once were due to 
continuation in time and space.218 Parfit’s model is incompatible with the PGC: to say that we 
never change would be more absurd than saying that we change rapidly in every second that 
we live and breathe. However, and pursuant to the PGC, to say that personal identity changes is 
a thoroughly bold statement. If this were true, we would never know who we were, and there 
could be no accountability for, or purpose in, our actions, with the exception of change itself for 
the sake of changing. As we know, the heart of agency is autonomy, and the application of 
autonomy is seen in the notion that purposes are pursued for whatever reasons an agent 
216 Parfit 1984, 282- 302.
217 Parfit 1984, 282- 302.
218 Parfit 1984, 282- 302.
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ascribes. If we do say that personal identity changes, this means that any previously expressed 
wishes and feelings would have to be ignored. This approach is only legitimate if there are very 
strong reasons to believe this; in turn, a person’s identity could be said to have changed.   If an 
agent’s whole ethos, thought process, memories and everything else making them a particular 
agent changes, we can no longer treat them as the same agent. Such an occurrence is rare, and 
would apply predominantly to those suffering from the more severe stages of dementia. 
So whilst is agreed that you can lose personal identity in a number of ways, it cannot be 
agreed per Gewirth that personal identity changes rapidly and regularly as in the above ‘space 
and time’ instrument. However, the PGC would support the view held by Buchanan that the 
necessary criterion for personal continuity requires some degree of psychological continuity.219
For the purposes of this chapter, and because the theory fits with Gewirth’s PGC, I will 
be using a model loosely based on the ‘psychological continuity’ model outlined by Buchanan 
above. In defining ‘personal identity’ as a referendum for continuity of the person, I look to 
using the patient’s having consciousness as the de minimis basis of psychological continuity, a 
slight variation on the model presented by Buchanan.
Currently, as outlined in the first chapter of this thesis, where an adult in law executes a 
valid and applicable advance refusal, he may refuse any treatment indefinitely. Yet, the physical 
and psychological development of a person through time, particularly where severe 
neurological change occurs, causes that person to change. Without addressing the matters 
presented by the personal identity problem, the MCA 2005 is evading consideration of those 
key ethical implications for patient care and will in turn continue to produce a mixed-bag of 
results. Such consideration should be an obligation as the absence of guidance often leads to 
misguidance.
219 Buchanan 1988,  279.
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5.3 Reason in ‘Precautionary Reasoning’
The practical difficulties presented in the personal identity problem in respect of 
dementia patients relate to delineating where a person loses their autonomy and many of the 
characteristics once determining them ‘unique’. The two issues here to be addressed are i) 
whether the person is an ostensible agent and ii) whether that ostensible agent (if yes) is the 
same agent as before. These levels of ‘attachment’ of being with the dementia patient’s former 
self will indicate (in the relevant stages of dementia), where/ if A person ends and B person 
begins. The approach can never be broad-brushed and ought to be based upon the medical 
presentation and psychological and physical continuity of the dementia patient. We look to 
precautionary reasoning now to address these issues. 
The precautionary reasoning argument developed by Beyleveld and Pattinson attempts 
to fortify the PGC in its pragmatic approach to showing where agency does and does not exist:
“Quite simply, this argument establishes that any agent must treat other (epistemically) 
possible agents who are able to behave as though they are agents (viz., ostensible 
agents) as agents whether or not they (unknowably for the agent) actually are agents, 
which means that they must be granted the generic rights by all agents. Furthermore, it 
entails that those behavioural capacities and associated physical/biological structures 
that provide evidence for ostensible agency must be taken morally (for precautionary 
reasons) as evidence (but not necessarily complete evidence) of agency in other beings 
by agents. The precautionary argument that we apply to apparent non-agents is 
developed from this basic precautionary argument and must be understood as such”.220
5.3.1 The Precautionary Reasoning Argument
The argument is as follows:
We are asked to consider three beings:
i) oneself  (A) (the only being we can be certain is an agent);
220 Beyleveld and Pattinson 2010, 260-261.
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ii) an ‘ostensible agent’ (B) (another being who behaves as if it is an agent and is 
therefore ostensibly an agent); and
iii)a non-ostensible agent (C) (another being who does not display the abilities of an 
agent and hence is not an ostensible agent).
The inter-relationship of agent-statuses as between the parties A, B and C, is a seminal 
consideration when applying the PGC in practice. We are told that, as A cannot know B is not an 
agent without making ill-founded metaphysical assumptions, A must suppose B to be an agent, 
B is an ostensible agent so we must, and can, treat B as an agent. This is because acting on this 
presumption does not violate the PGC if B is not in fact an agent, but treating B as a non-agent 
if B is in fact an agent would violate the PGC, and it is possible to treat B as an agent.
Beyleveld and Pattinson configure that the argument of precaution imposes duties on A 
in relation to C. These duties amount to moral duties, but not rights. In this way, C could be 
viewed as what they term ‘an object of a degree of moral concern’ from the perspective of A in 
‘proportion to (variously) the probability that C might be an agent under precaution’. This 
element of the argument relies on how easy it is to imagine that C is an agent; or how close C‘s 
observable characteristics, which are displayed, are similar to that of an ostensible agent. This 
aspect really revolves around a balancing act as against the competing attributes of agency.
Because the precautionary reasoning argument requires only those possible agents who 
are categorised ostensible agents to be actually treated as agents the demarcation of agency 
and agent rights is concise. This distinction is drawn because ‘to treat a being as an agent is to 
grant it the generic rights and to impose the correlative generic duties on it’.221 This view is 
logical – we cannot grant rights to those things which we cannot class as agents because this 
would be impracticable and irrational. 
Patients are always a B or a C. Those in category B would include patients with dementia 
as well as any other human beings, aside from ourselves, who pursue purposes voluntarily. 
Those who are in a PVS would be classed as being in category C.  
221 Pattinson 2010, 261.
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While it is accepted this approach does not ‘answer’ the personal identity problem, at 
least this approach does provide an answer to the important question; ‘does this person 
matter?’ And when you look at the world around, you can only be sure about yourself as 
voluntarily choosing purposes, therefore classing another being as an ostensible agent is the 
highest classification grantable. 
5.3.2 Why Relevant Behavioural Display Should Also be Included in Legislation
Precautionary reasoning per Beyleveld and Pattinson proliferates to provide further 
categorization, distinguishing between at least four qualitatively different levels of ‘relevant 
behavioural display’ (herein ‘RBD’). As I have distinguished between the levels of ‘beings’; I will 
only set out the four levels of RBD categorised L1-L4 which are relevant to this thesis (although 
there are more): 222
1) L1 includes those who clearly behave like agents and are ostensible agents, i.e. 
human beings and hypothetical non-human animals or plants which behave as agents 
(category B).
2) L2 entails beings that we are uncertain behave like agents (such as human 
children at early stages of communicative competence; dolphins; whales; non-human 
primates; some birds) (category B). 
3) L3 beings are those who do not quite behave like agents but have some of the 
behavioural capacities that apparent agents display i.e. that have the necessary but not 
sufficient characteristics to be classified as ostensible agents (which, arguably, includes, 
whether adult or not, dogs, cats, pigs, horses, cattle, sheep, earthworms, plants, 
bacteria; computers with some self-regulating functions). At least some display of 
evidence of consciousness is needed at this level and the two levels above (category C). 
4) L4 includes beings that do not behave like agents and exhibit no behavioural 
capacities of ostensible agents223 (e.g., rocks) (category C).
222 Please see Beyleveld and Pattinson (full article) 2010 for expansion of this point.
223 Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000 Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, esp. 124, and Pattinson 2002, esp. 
73).
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5.4 Filling Lacunae with Precaution
If we imagine the below four different categories of persons, the problem of not addressing the 
identity of persons with a moral-compass becomes apparent. Relating back to the issues 
thrown up by the personal identity problem, and to the answer of the question ‘does this 
person matter?’ discussed under the chapter three, the law says that we all matter. The 
difficulty in answering this question so succinctly occurs where there is a significant personality 
change. Using the PGC and precautionary reasoning argument due to the logical reasoning I 
earlier presented, I will now explore this point. 
Imagine four different people. Person A finds themselves in a state of PVS person B in a 
MCS, person C is ‘locked-in’ and the next (person D), has dementia. The ostensible difference 
here in each case is that each person’s connection with their former selves, due to varying 
levels or at least displays of consciousness (and therefore psychological continuity), varies 
greatly. In the event that each has made a valid and applicable advance refusal in line with the 
MCA 2005, the PGC is a good place to start as a referral point.
Person A:  Outlined by William James,224 the stream of consciousness itself is founded in 
a person’s ability to experience environment, existence, thought and sensations as an ongoing 
process in tune with their inner voice, creating episodic memories. Consciousness is the 
grounding for ostensible agency. The controversial Peter Singer put forward that:
“the most significant ethically relevant characteristic of human beings whose brains 
have ceased to function is not that they are members of our species, but that they have 
no prospect of regaining consciousness. Without consciousness, continued life cannot 
benefit them”.225
Whilst there have been a multitude of cases of misdiagnosis of patients in a PVS,226 there has 
never been any recovery from this state where it is proven. It is therefore widely accepted that, 
224 James, 1890.
225 Singer, P. 1995, 207.
226 One such case saw a 12 year-old boy’s parents being forced into signing organ donation agreements 
in the same minute that EEG scans picked up signs of brain activity see further Bohannon 2012.
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if there are no positive aspects of keeping a person alive, and where attempting to do so is 
inhumane unnecessary and futile (where no degree of consciousness may be established), 
there should be no obligation to do so or to attempt to do so. As discussed at 3.2 this was the 
outcome in Bland,227 which would also be supported by Gewirthian theory as patients proven 
to be in a PVS are non-ostensible agents (see further 4.1.1 & 5.3.1-5.3.2).  
In one article, Catherine Constable suggests that the current medical presumption 
favouring provision of ANH to PVS patients is a ‘violation of autonomy’. Constable objects to 
such interference on the grounds that it ‘goes against the best interests of the patient’ in 
scenarios when there are either doubts about a patient’s wishes or where such wishes are 
unknown.228 Actually, for the purpose of the PGC, person A is classed as belonging to L4 so if an 
advance refusal did not exist, the PGC would not rule out this approach. It is accepted under 
the PGC that because agents would have a correlative moral obligation towards such beings to 
primarily preserve their wishes, values, views and beliefs, if previous wishes had been 
expressed (even if these were not in the format the MCA 2005 requires) the substituted 
judgment approach would be more appropriate as the default position. This would be the case 
unless the personal identity problem applied (I return to this notion at 6.2). 
In the case of Person B there are widespread issues of misdiagnosis of those in MCS 
where ‘locked-in’ syndrome has been undetected (although this is now rare with the 
introduction of very specific testing for electro-neural activity). This was one of the issues 
brought to light in the case of Re M discussed in the previous chapter.229 Criteria for diagnosis 
as to the level of brain activity has been created – indeed the most recent revelation has been 
made by Professor Adrian Owen leading research at the Brain and Mind Institute of Western 
Ontario.230 Owen’s pioneering method of communication with his most recent patients (in a 
PVS) used the technique of encouraging a level of physical reaction through the pretence of 
playing tennis or walking around their own homes. From this, answers ‘yes’ and ‘no’ were 
227 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland. [1993] A.C. 789. 
228 Constable 2012,163.
229 Re M [2011].
230 Smith, 2012.
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obtained from one patient to ascertain whether or not they were in a state of pain, whether 
they knew who they were, and so on. Such communicative strategies are absolutely seminal to 
understanding the link between a person’s former and current self. The operation of these 
strategies means that families ‘fighting’ for the right of their loved ones to be kept alive 
artificially in line with pre-existing staunch religious beliefs or advance refusals231 can be done 
morally.232Yet this approach sparks the worry that the thought of playing tennis or walking 
around one’s home are gravely different to expounding one’s wishes and feelings about more 
pivotal questions such as whether or not a formerly executed advance refusal to remove ANH 
and ventilation ought to be enforced. Relating more generally to MCS, in one article, a doctor 
was reported as saying ‘it is difficult to tell whether she is oblivious or struggling to 
respond’.233Despite difficulty in being certain, those in a MCS would be classed as ostensible 
agents under precautionary reasoning, as we could not rule out the existence of consciousness 
in their neural-activity; they would be classed under L3 above.
Person C: When considering the treatment of person C, prima facie this is straight 
forward – if a person is able to communicate a contemporaneous decision made by them, and 
can adequately weigh, believe and understand the information and decision they make, in line 
with s.3 MCA 2005 then this remains their final decision. Prior to losing all ability to 
communicate and with the help of advances in aiding-equipment, many who suffer from the 
most common cause of locked-in syndrome express themselves with the use of blinking letters 
231 Marsden, 2012.
232 The Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) stated in 2007 the withdrawal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration from PVS patients is immoral; ‘The administration of food and water 
even by artificial means is, in principle, an ordinary and proportionate means of preserving life. It is 
therefore obligatory to the extent to which, and for as long as, it is shown to accomplish its proper 
finality, which is the hydration and nourishment of the patient. In this way suffering and death by 
starvation and dehydration are prevented.’ Their statements were approved by Pope Benedict XVI
(Levada, 2007) available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20070801_ris
poste-usa_en.html <accessed 14/10/2012>
233 McGowan, 2011.
71
to loved ones or by using Eye-gaze Response Interface Computer Aid (ERICA).234 ERICA enables 
user to write emails and letters using the computer – this software can also produce a 
computerised voice, allowing the patient to ‘talk’ to others (this is the same system used daily 
by Stephen Hawking). Locked-in syndrome occurs where a person has a level of consciousness 
without the ability to move or communicate verbally due to complete paralysis of nearly all 
voluntary muscles in the body except for the eyes. Total locked-in syndrome occurs where the 
eyes are also paralyzed.235 Person C, in being-locked in (thus a locked-in ostensible agent), 
would amount to an L1 being.  When those who are locked-in lose the ability to communicate, 
then their final word remains the last expressed and there can be no reason to doubt that they 
are the same person as before. But there are ensuing issues as person C may experience severe 
difficulty with communicating their wishes, values, views and beliefs. 
Finally, in person D — deep set dementia such as the latter stages Alzheimer’s may 
change the person’s identity significantly. Those suffering from dementia would also be classed 
as L1 ostensible agents if they till retained their ability to communicate and had based 
competence; where task based competence and the ability to communicate are both lost, such 
a person would be classed as belonging to L2 or even L3 So it is apparent that dementia 
sufferers could either come under category B or C. Categorisation is key and understanding that 
the personal identity problem is a problem for many dementia sufferers, namely those whose 
personalities have changed significantly, is the first step towards offering such persons better 
treatment in line with the MCA’s main provisions. And until the personal identity problem does 
become an issue (i.e. for some persons in early-stage dementia), advance refusals should not be 
automatically ruled out as not being binding which is the current stance. Defining when the 
personal identity problem becomes a problem is a matter for the medical profession to 
consider; in the case of those with deep set dementia for example, applying the pre-dementia 
patient’s wishes would be exactly the same as considering one person’s rights over the next. In 
234 This, for example, uses a camera and infrared light to detect the position of a person's gaze on a 
computer screen. In this way, a person can essentially type with his or her eyes, performing computer 
tasks normally.
235 Locked-in syndrome is also known as cerebromedullospinal disconnection de-efferented 
state, pseudocoma ventral pontine syndrome.
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this way, any application of rights considering the ‘former’ person would be inconsistent with 
the PGC where such a drastic change in personality renders this the case. Conversely, in the 
early stages of dementia, where it could reasonably be believed that an advance refusal would 
still apply, it should. In both of the afore mentioned cases, a person’s formers wishes, values, 
views and beliefs must be considered, and the careful balancing act between granting 
autonomy where possible, as well as considering the implications of the personal identity 
problem – this would need to be done on a case-by-case basis and would always need to be 
addressed by the medical professionals dealing with the patient, and by the Court of 
Protection. This leads us into Dworkin’s argument which is more complicated to dissect.
5.4.1 Dworkin’s Margo: Questioning the Notion of Experiential Interests
Dworkin presents an interesting argument concerning the matter of personhood and builds on 
the personal identity problem. In Life’s Dominion236 Dworkin targets the applicability of advance 
refusals in relation to those suffering from dementia. His theory is based on the integrity view;
which does not assume that people have consistent values or make consistent choices during 
life. He opposes the evidentiary view of autonomy which outlines the absolute respect of a 
decision made by a competent adult – the same view reflected in the MCA 2005. Dworkin’s 
reasoning behind such rejection springs from the patient’s precedent autonomy, this being 
that:
“a competent person’s right to autonomy requires that his past decisions about how he 
is to be treated if he becomes demented be respected even if they contradict the 
desires that he has at that later point”.237
From this,  we are presented with Margo, a resident patient suffering from Alzheimer’s who 
enjoys her life perfectly according to a medical student regularly attending to her and taking 
reports – she attends art classes, greets people generically, etc. The student assesses Margo as 
being ‘one of the happiest people’ he has ever known. However, prior to becoming ill with the 
236 Dworkin 1993, 222-237.
237 Dworkin 1993, 228.
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disease, Dworkin asks us to consider that Margo made a very clear advance refusal that, in the 
case of Alzheimer’s:
“she should not receive treatment for any other serious, life-threatening disease she 
might contract, or even in that event, she should be killed as soon and as painlessly as 
possible”.238
At this juncture, we are asked to weigh up her interests in a subjective manner. Following on 
from any precedent autonomy she has exerted by way of her advance refusal, we must 
consider Margo’s interests in her current environment and in her present state today. This must 
then be weighed against her former interests exhibited through a completely express, clear 
statement of wishes made autonomously. These are separated; ‘experiential’ and ‘critical’ 
interests respectively.  Those interests categorised as ‘experiential’ concern the ability to value 
the things one experiences, such as eating a favourite food, listening to certain pieces of music. 
Those termed ‘critical’ interests preside over these, and concern more than that which we 
experience, these concern our core values. For Dworkin, Margo’s critical interests which were 
considered when she was able to form an advance refusal, override her experiential interests. 
In this case, an advance refusal made by a person pre- dementia, could and would still apply to 
their later selves, arguably different persons. Dworkin treats the advance refusal as binding due 
to its nature, and due to the severity of consideration of the subject given when the competent 
patient made a decision. To disregard such critical interests and to view Margo in her current, 
‘happy’ state would, in Dworkin’s view, disrespect the wishes of that once competent patient. It 
must be noted here that Dworkin’s Margo is seen as being the same person at all times despite 
the fact that the core aspects of her being have, on the whole, changed adversely, as will be 
argued in line with the PGC.
From this, the matter really does not concern critical or experiential issues as we see 
them presented by Dworkin. This is because dementia renders Margo an L1 being — i.e. those 
who clearly behave like ostensible agents, but the issue at hand is that she may not be the 
same person who made the advance refusal. If it is seen that she is now a derivation of her 
238 Dworkin 1993, 226.
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former self, then she is a being who must be assessed in its own right and on the basis of what 
is best for her now. If a patient is the same patient they were when making an advance refusal, 
i.e. they share some degree of psychological continuity with their former selves in the absence 
of being able to communicate or act otherwise, then an advance refusal still stands. If, 
however, they are a different patient, then the advance refusal does not hold effect and 
instead, some form of addressing the patient’s best interests must be employed. Dworkin hints 
that an essential ingredient of personhood is a competent adult’s right to autonomy; this is true 
also for ostensible agents. Margo is only autonomous now in that she can decide in that 
moment some simple matters.  Intriguingly, Margo is presented as two different people –
Margo the competent decision maker – and Margo the dementia patient. Yet, Dworkin treats 
them as one, not taking into account Margo I’s wishes and instead replacing these with the 
‘experiential’ interests of her later counterpart Margo II; yet his whole argument is enshrouded 
in avoidance of the question, are these same people? If the answer is yes, as the argument 
seems to suggest at first blush, then it follows that Margo I’s original advance refusal be 
followed as her last wishes expressed when she had capacity to do so are her wishes in toto. If 
the answer is no, this is because the loss of autonomy that Margo II’s condition entails has 
rendered her at the very least a radically changed ostensible agent, to be assessed in its own 
right.
5.4.2 So Who is Margo and Does She (and her Advance Refusal) Matter?
For a Gewirthian, it follows that when dealing with Margo in the present day, she would be 
classed as an ostensible agent, a B) and a L1.This is supported by the duties-based approach 
outlined by Beyleveld and Pattinson.239Margo ‘matters’.
However, the personal identity problem is next to be considered. With Alzheimer’s , 
because of the ‘change’ or ‘break’ in continuity of the person due to loss of memory, 
preferences, and the ability to recognise those once loved, there will be circumstances where 
neither an advance refusal of treatment (where there is one), nor the best interests test (where 
there is not) would apply; a point which I return to later. In this situation, a form of assessment 
239 Beyleveld and Pattinson 2010.
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would need to be made as to the probability that the former advance refusal could still apply. 
The PGC would first want to consider, where practicable, what they would have wanted if they 
could have communicated it at that time. Such assessment would not need to be made, for 
example, in early-stage dementia, where it could be proven by medical professionals that 
Margo was still Margo, for the purpose of the personal identity problem. Any assessment would 
also need to take into consideration whether or not she had task-specific competence to 
understand more how best to treat he – enjoying art classes is different to being able to make 
decisions concerning health, life and death. 
Dworkin’s presentation of Margo overlooks the critical need for understanding of the 
implications of the personal identity problem when dealing with dementia. It is imperative to
consider the elements which make us the person that we are particularly, as opposed to 
another person. In addition, the scale of ‘needs’ is not fixed as per the two segregated 
categories of interests Dworkin believes them to be.  
It is imperative that personal identity is considered in relation to those suffering from 
dementia, as this allows for use of the most appropriate ‘test’ if no advance refusal has been 
made. Similarly, if an advance refusal has been created, this would allow for proper 
consideration of its effectiveness. Autonomy could not always preside where psychological 
continuity is deficient. 
5.4.3 Advance Directives for Dementia Patients: Why the Dutch System is Too Ambitious
Where Dworkin argues that the critical interests of persons prevail, the law, and the PGC, would 
deem this as a harsh approach. This is because when the personal identity problem is invoked, 
an advance refusal could not automatically apply. Murdering the now happy Margo to satisfy 
the wants of her former self would be inconsistent with agency. To merge Dworkinian terms 
with Gewirthian theory, Margo II’s critical and experiential interests may have changed, but 
they exist now, as they are, in the midst of dementia. They must be treated now. 
In the case of ‘happy’ dementia patients who once made an advance refusal, the 
treatment of the patient as ‘new’ may not be difficult. A ‘live’ system taking the opposite view, 
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is found in the Netherlands. Where it is assessed that where the dementia patient, is 
experiencing ‘unbearable suffering’, an ‘Advance Directive for Euthanasia’ (herein ‘ADE(s)’) may 
be upheld. This approach affords utmost autonomy over any future derivation of self, as 
supported by the following statement from a GP cited by Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant: 
“In respecting his or her will, we pay homage to a patient who was once alive, and not 
to a human being who no longer knows if he or she exists”.240
Dutch euthanasia directives are legally available for all persons with a legally recognised level of 
capacity from as young as 12 with parental consent, and over 18 without, and may expressly 
apply where dementia occurs. Article 2.2 in The Dutch Euthanasia Legislation (WTL) dictates the 
law in this area. In terms of applicability, these directives must be directive made out to this 
effect in writing241 and if the doctor is satisfied that the patient is experiencing ‘unbearable 
suffering with no prospect of improvement’, they can administer the treatment to end that 
person’s life. 
In a 2010 study on the operation of Dutch ADEs, 434 elderly care physicians (herein 
‘ECP’s’ – the sector dealing with 92% of all dementia patients ) were asked to consider whether 
the legality of ADEs led to more euthanasia.242 In response to the statement; ‘it is impossible to 
determine at what moment an Advance Directive for Euthanasia of persons with dementia is to 
be carried out’, 76.2% of all physicians in the state asked at least agreed more than they 
disagreed with this statement (with the majority fully agreeing).243 The same survey found that 
the law around ADEs was ‘morally problematic’ for these main reasons:
“Determining the (unbearableness of) suffering of the patient and planning the moment 
of executing the ADE becomes very difficult, making it virtually impossible for 
(physicians) to perform euthanasia…ADEs may fulfil a complimentary role, in the sense 
240 De Volkskrant, See http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/news-brief/3779801-doctors-euthanasia-
dementia-patients-should-be-restricted <accessed 28/05/2013>
241 It is even currently being debated whether this particular kind of euthanasia directive may also be 
made orally by the euthanasia committee in the Netherlands, calling for a widening of the applicability 
of euthanasia advance directives for patent with dementia.
242de Boer et al 2010.
243de Boer et al 2010.
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of initiating or supporting discussions between the patient, physician, family and other 
health care professionals, in the early stages of dementia, but where the possibility for 
communication and joint decision-making is lost, they offer no viable approach towards 
a good death”.244
Resulting newspaper headlines such as ‘Dutch Docs Pushed to Euthanise More Patients with 
Dementia’245 are cause for concern. The area of euthanasia directives on the whole has been 
summarised as a ‘grey area’ as reported by Sheldon.246
Although ambitious to preserve patient autonomy, unfortunately the Dutch system is 
riddled with inadequacies from an ethical viewpoint as the personal identity problem is not 
fully considered. The Dutch approach highlights the danger of legislation leaving behind the 
professionals who use it, such ‘grey areas’ seen in the law in the Netherlands are also seen, to a 
different degree, in England and Wales.
5.5 Problem-proofing Legislation
In addition to what he termed the ‘three general asymmetries’247 which translates as the main 
challenges to the value to be found in advance refusals per se, Alan Buchanan also provided a 
succinct account as to why personal identity could prove to be the most prolific objection to the 
argument outlining the value to be found in advance refusals:
“this is the objection that the very process that renders the individual competent and 
brings the advance directive into play can – and indeed often does – destroy the 
conditions necessary for her personal identity and thereby undercut entirely the moral 
authority of the directive”.248
244de Boer et al 2010.
245 Smith, W.J. 2013.
246 Sheldon 2013.
247 Buchanan 1988,  279.
248 Buchanan 1988, 280.
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Because there is, ostensibly, no recognition of the problem of personal identity in the MCA 
2005, this is problematic in itself. Whilst it is maintained under the PGC, that is difficult to lose 
personal identity, it is still possible for this to happen. If, in the extremity we claim akin to the 
theory of Parfit249 that personal identity changes with ‘time and space’, this means that any 
previously expressed wishes and feelings would have to be ignored. For a Gewirthian a loss of 
personal identity would rely upon strong evidence of a complete change of personality – in real 
terms this would apply mainly those with severe cases of dementia. I once again return to the 
premise that just because capacity cannot be established with some persons suffering from 
with dementia, this does not mean that task-specific competence is not present.
As legislation is not tackling the problem of personal identity, Penney Lewis offers up 
two exclusions as to be inserted into s.26 of the 2005 Act:
1) a dementia-only exclusion: ‘P is not suffering from dementia’;
2) a personal identity exclusion ‘P’s personal identity has not been seriously    
compromised by P’s impairing condition’.250
Recognised by Lewis,251 both of these provisions may be subject to difficulty in implementation. 
The dementia-only exclusion would be very ethically problematic in application as in the early-
onset of dementia, advance refusals may still be applicable. Moreover, the latter of the two 
proposed additions would be almost impossible to uphold, but at least this provides a starting 
point for consideration of the problem.
Any legislative change would need to revolve around the two main issues to always be 
reasoned which I reiterate are:
1) Whether or not the person ‘matters’;  and whether ostensible agency can be 
established (following consideration of personhood); and, 
2) How proximate the personal identity of the now person is to their former selves. 
This is a very subjective test. As will be discussed in the following chapter, the 
249Parfit 1984, 282- 302.
250 Lewis 2006, 232-233.
251 Ibid, 230.
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welfare and treatment of those who exhibit dramatically separate behaviours, 
values and characteristics from their former selves are currently judged on the best 
interests test. This test may not always be considered accurate. This is due to 
contention around what action can be viewed as being truly in their best interests as 
opposed to what the person applying the test believes is in another person’s best 
interests. If this person does matter and if their personal identity is a problem, what 
would they want now, if they could choose for themselves?
Lewis insists that consideration of the personal identity problem, that is excluding advance 
refusals as not applying for those who have suffered severe personality changes, in and of itself 
can lead to violation of Article 8 ECHR. Following this assertion, it is viewed that in the case of 
those with dementia, ‘translating this in to the legal arena is likely to be extremely difficult, if 
not impossible’.252 It is here contended that lack of consideration of the problem in practice is 
actually doing this. Indeed, the redundancy of advance decisions where extreme personality 
changes have occurred, and in particular for those with end stage dementia, it would rarely be 
prudent to apply an advance refusal. Why? Because the personal identity problem is invoked. 
Facing the problem would actually, against Lewis’ view, be in line with the PGC, and would 
enable persons with dementia to have their wishes, values, views and beliefs assessed as part 
of a framework. Such a framework is imperative as, currently, no stabilisers exist to ensure 
careful consideration. On the whole, it is more consistent with Article 8 that a person with 
dementia is viewed from the above perspective and in terms of personhood, personal identity 
and finally, preserving their autonomous wishes where possible.  
In the MCA 2005’s main provisions for advance refusals, the importance of self-ascribed 
value and autonomy is central. Because self-awareness and consciousness are central to 
determining moral status, without this, dementia patients cannot be treated as being the 
person they were pre-dementia. Currently, dementia patients are always viewed as a derivation 
of their former selves in an unregulated manner, which I have coined a ‘new’ self. This ‘new 
self’, much like Dworkin’s Margo will have new interests, and a new personal identity for the 
252 Lewis 2006, 234.
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purpose of the argument. As it is difficult to lose identity under the PGC, declaring a person a 
‘new self’ would require a great degree of evidence. 
It is hoped that this chapter has highlighted the importance of the issues of personal 
identity and personhood and the lacunae existing within the MCA 2005 which do not address 
these matters fully. If we do not legislatively address the issue of personal identity, and we 
leave it up to medical practitioners and judges alone, this could be fateful. Codification is 
needed so the provisions purporting to elevate self-determination are only accessible by those 
to whom they will still apply. This will not be an easy process remembering, as adduced by Alan 
Fox, that:
“a person should be understood as an active process, not a thing – not even a thing that 
undergoes change and self-replacement during its lifetime”.253
At the forefront, the personal identity problem affects patient care, the role of the medical 
profession, scientific research, public policy and life and death. Not considering the problem is a 
breach of the obligations of the 2005 Act and a direct infringement of the UDHR requirement of 
treating all beings as equal in dignity and respect. 
253 Fox 2007.
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CHAPTER SIX: PAVING A NEW WAY FORWARD
6.1 Whose Best Interests?
The best interests test is very difficult to apply in circumstances where an advance refusal is 
either not enforceable or where one has not been made. Pattinson warns of the caveats when 
using such a test:
“If application of the best interests test does not operate according to the  explicit 
criteria specifying what are relevant ’goods’ or ‘interests’(or at least how they are to be 
determined) and specifying the approach that is to be taken to weighing those goods 
where they point in different directions, the best interests tests will operate as little 
more than a cloak for the application of the decision makers’ contingent values… there 
is an unavoidable element of ethical evaluation inherent in the attempt to determine 
what is ‘best’ for the patient under the guise of the best interests test’’.254
In relation to advance directives made by dementia patients it is arguably more difficult to 
know how best to preserve a person’s wishes, values, views and beliefs. This is especially true 
without the direction of clear guidelines to navigate the personal identity problem.
6.1.1 Changes to Be Made to the Current Test
Currently, in the absence of a valid and applicable advance refusal, and in the absence of 
capacity, a patient’s welfare is judged in line with the best interests test found in s.4 of the MCA 
2005. Per s.4(6) of the MCA 2005, when judging what is in a patient’s best interests  as far as 
‘reasonably ascertainable’, consideration must be given to:
(a) the person's past and present wishes and feelings;
254 Pattinson 2011, 166.
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(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had 
capacity; and,
(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.
When assessing what is best, the person making the determination must not do so ‘merely on 
the basis’ of the ‘person's age or appearance’, ‘or a condition or an aspect of behaviour’… 
‘which may lead to assumptions about what might be in his best interests.’255 The MCA 2005 
does allow for the external consultation of the patient’s close contacts to gain knowledge as 
background i.e. those named by the patient (e.g. LPAs), anyone engaged in caring for or 
interested in the patient’s welfare, and any deputy.256 It is noteworthy that, when making a 
Lasting Power of Attorney for health and welfare, if a person does not tick the relevant box, 
even appointed attorneys cannot make decisions about life-sustaining treatment.257
This test does not sit well with the bold intentions of respecting autonomy – a theme 
resounding through the MCA 2005. The truth is that advance refusals are too readily ignored or 
overridden.258Most people in England and Wales do not make an advance refusal; the notion of 
what is in the patient’s best interests is therefore paramount. It is here submitted that what Fox 
and McHale term the ‘vague rhetoric of best interests’259 is in need of a serious revamp; the 
test is only rarely relevant today as it largely serves as a repressor of autonomy and a vehicle 
for those applying it to make whichever decision they deem fit. The case of Re Y260 illustrates 
the difficulties encountered when applying the best interests test. The case was brought about 
by P, the sister of Y, a woman who was incapacitated physically and mentally from birth. P 
sought a declaration that the removal and transplantation of Y’s compatible bone marrow to 
keep P alive was lawful. Without such a transplant, P would have no reasonable prospect of 
255 s.4(1)(a)and(b) MCA 2005.
256 s4(6)(7)(a) to (d) MCA 2005.
257 This features on p.6 of the document. For the official template used for an LPA of health and welfare 
please see the Office of the Public Guardian website. The document is accessible here; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/245571/LPA114_Heal
th_welfare_LPA.pdf <accessed 22/12/2013>
258 Such as in the case of A Local Authority v E (2012) EWHC 1639 (COP); 2 F.C.R. 523. See 4.2 for further 
discussion of this case.
259 McHale, 1997.
260 Re Y [1997] Fam. 110.
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survival. Connell, J. held, granting the declarations, that the operations and transplant were in
Y’s best interests as this would provide emotional, physical and social benefit to Y with ‘minimal 
detriment’.261 Another ‘benefit’ to Y was that the transplant would sustain familial ties between 
Y and her visiting mother and sister. Pattinson summarises this blatant misapplication of the 
best interests test:
“a cynic might be tempted by the view that Re Y did not strictly adhere to the patient’s 
best interests at all, especially since she did not appreciate that the lady who visited her 
was her mother”.262
There are three main issues which remain unresolved in the use of the best interests test as it 
is. First of all, the definition of ‘best interests’ has never been laid down specifically. This is 
inadequately justified ‘because so many different types of decisions and actions are covered by 
the Act, and so many different people and circumstances are affected by it’.263 The MCA 2005 is 
expected to go further than simply admitting to this; ‘because every case …is different, the law 
can’t set out all the factors that will need to be taken into account in working out someone’s 
best interests’.264 Recently, an application was made to the Supreme Court for an order that 
life-sustaining treatment be withheld in the best interests of a mentally incapacitated patient.  
The three five sitting justices in the case ruled that the focus had to be on whether or not it 
would be in the patient’s best interests to administer the treatment, rather than to withhold it. 
This is one example of how the best interests test is moulded for use in practice.265
The second issue, and discussed by Tomossy and Weisstub,266 is that the test does not 
lay down any real objectives.267 Their argument sets out that the standards of ‘best interests’ 
generally ‘fail to distinguish between what they aim to do and how their aims might be 
261 Re Y, 1997.
262 Pattinson 2011, 165.
263 as confirmed at 5.5. in the MCA CoP.
264 MCA CoP Para. 5. 13.
265 See Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James on appeal from: [2013] EWCA Civ 
65SC; [2013] UKSC 67; 2013 WL 5730338 (per Lady Hale) esp. at 45.
266 Tomossy and Weisstub 1997,10-13.
267Ibid, 10-13.
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operationalised’.268 This ‘unregulated’ approach is a danger in itself as interpretation of ‘best 
interests’ depends on the decision-making judge (or medical professional) in question. Lacking 
any main objective, the test becomes moulded to the ways and wants of those applying it 
which was seen in the cases of A Local Authority v E269 and Re M270 above. It is from this view 
that Hope et al urge that the MCA CoP should contain deeper objectives for determination of 
what a person’s best interests comprise.271 Although somewhat of a protagonist of the best 
interests test, Mary Donnelly highlighted that an objective test which in reality contains 
subjective elements involves a lack of precision in practice.272
Owing to the benefit to be found in clarity, it is suggested here that the MCA 2005 
would benefit from the introduction and concentration of one key objective when it comes to 
the best interests test (or any of the other, suggested applicable tests): 
“To preserve the person’s wishes, values, views and beliefs in as much as possible as 
they would be now could he/she communicate them, and if he/she had capacity to do 
so as supported by evidence”. 
This key objective is seen to work immediately when applied to the currently confusing 
demands of s.4(6) MCA 2005.273 This proposed underlying objective is more in line with the 
spirit of the MCA 2005, and where no advance refusal is in place, such an attitude would not 
allow for such misdirection of what is best for a person as if those applying the test had free 
rein (as they do currently) to decide what is best for a person. Hope et al274 detail this approach 
as being ‘what advance decision the person might have made’ when he had capacity, which is 
really a semi-version of the substituted judgment test (for substituted judgment, the standard 
268 Tomossy and Weisstub,1997,12.
269 A Local Authority v E (2012); EWHC 1639 (COP); 2 F.C.R. 523 2012.
270 Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287.
271 Hope et al 2009, 735.
272 Donnelly 2011, 313.
273 Where there are currently three key factors set out in s.4(6)(a) to (c) of, only subsection (a) 
(consideration of the person’s past and present wishes and feelings) provides  the foundation for 
ascertaining the best interests of a person who lacks capacity. The others will then follow from this.
274 Ibid.
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would be what he would have decided if he could). Again this approach could be workable with 
evidence to prove it. 
The third issue revolves around a major flaw which arises in 5.38 in the MCA’s CoP 
which is that the best interests test, despite consideration of past wishes and feelings, also acts 
as authority to override these:
“In setting out the requirements for working out a person’s ‘best interests’… Any such 
assessment must consider past and current wishes and feelings, beliefs and values 
alongside all other factors, but the ﬁnal decision must be based entirely on what is in 
the person’s best interests”.
This presentation of three main problems is not exhaustive, yet it shows that the best interests 
test needs some direction – as it stands currently the test is allowing others to make decisions 
for persons without any real attempt275 to preserve what they would have wanted. The 
subjectiveness of the test is not the problem, the lack of overarching objectives and guidance 
that goes with this, are. In any case, the best interests test will not always be the most 
appropriate mechanism for judging how best to consider the treatment of persons where an 
advance refusal cannot be applicable. There are times when the substituted judgment standard 
is appropriate for the basis of determining what is best for patients. In actual fact, the 
substituted judgment test is already being applied under the guise of the best interests test. 
This was most recently confirmed in October 2013 in the Supreme Court ruling in Aintree 
University hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James and Others by Lady Hale:
“Insofar as Sir Alan Ward and Arden, LJ. were suggesting that the test of the patient's 
wishes and feelings was an objective one, what the reasonable patient would think, 
275 It is acknowledged, as above, that the family and friends of patients who are the subject of the tests 
are consulted in an attempt to gain insight into what they would have wanted and this is echoed in 
s4(6)(a) to (c). More guidance needs to be given around the objectives of the best interests test, and 
how to achieve these.
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again I respectfully disagree. The purpose of the best interests test is to consider 
matters from the patient's point of view.”276
In this chapter, it is argued that a new system is to be applied for gauging what is best for adults 
who lack capacity in healthcare decisions. It is sought that an effective standard must be 
defined which principally preserves the individual incapacitated person’s values, wishes, views 
and beliefs.
6.2 Using the Substituted Judgment Standard With Caution: Strunk v Strunk277
The substituted judgment standard relies on the assessment, made by an external decision 
maker, as to what decision an incompetent patient would make if they were competent at that 
time (and based upon past displays of competence). If the patient has never been competent as 
in the case of Re Y,278then this approach may not be taken.  This test is to be carried out with as 
much accuracy as possible in determining what a person would decide for themselves, if they 
could. The test is complex and amounts to a resurrection of the person’s wishes and beliefs at 
the last documented point and to the application of this in the here and now. As first 
articulated almost 200 years ago in the case of Re Hinde; Ex parte Whitbread:279
“the court will act with reference to the lunatic, and for his benefit, as it is probable that 
the lunatic himself would have acted had he been of sound mind”.280
This section therefore is dedicated to showing that the efficiency of using substituted judgment 
has attracted a wide spectrum of opinion. Dubbed a ‘legal fiction’ by Caroline Somers,281 if used 
incorrectly, the test can produce unwilling results as attaining a level of substituted judgment 
relies on gathering information about a person from various sources.  In the event of lacking 
276See Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James on appeal from: [2013] EWCA Civ 
65SC; [2013] UKSC 67; 2013 WL 5730338 (per Lady Hale) esp. at 45.
277 Strunk v Strunk (1969)
278 Re Y, 1997.
279 Re Hinde; Ex parte Whitbread (1816) 2 Meriv 99; 35 ER 878
280 Ibid.
281 Quoted in Donnelly 2011, 313.
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associated persons, the evidence pointing towards a person’s values, views and beliefs, as they 
would be now, is difficult to understand. Whilst a Gewirthian would advocate using the 
substituted judgment standard where possible, caution should always be taken and evidence 
should always be gathered to attempt achievement of what the person would have wanted 
now if he had capacity to communicate this. Such evidence could include material (not 
exhaustively) from any form of diarised thoughts even those found online i.e. from video blogs, 
Facebook and Twitter accounts, and the like. Widening the sources of evidence allowed could 
facilitate further exploration of religious, spiritual or other values and beliefs, views on politics, 
the World, life, death and all other matters in between. Even still, using such sources may be 
impugnable as updates can be conceived as being a social bravado, and may not be relied on as 
such. Hope, Slowther and Eccles expand upon this point; their scepticism of the efficacy of the 
substituted judgment standard due to wishes, values, views and beliefs being ‘fatally 
underspecified’.282 One of their contentions is that in a Margo-type scenario, applying the 
substituted judgment standard would be impossible. To illustrate this point, they speak of 
former vegetarians who, as a result of having Alzheimer’s, become carnivorous. They ask 
whether or not those caring for them should prevent this. Such a question is very simply 
answered by referring to said patient after going back to the original assessment to be made 
about personhood and personal identity. If the new carnivore is an ostensible agent, and the 
personal identity problem arises, then the substituted judgment standard cannot be applied, so 
the best interests test would apply (and vice versa).
In the UK, the substituted judgment standard is not used and was most recently rejected in the 
case of Bland.283 In Strunk v Strunk,284 Judge Osborne opened proceedings as follows:
“The specific question involved upon this appeal is: Does a court of equity have the 
power to permit a kidney to be removed from an incompetent ward of the state upon 
petition of his committee, who is also his mother, for the purpose of being transplanted 
282 Hope and Slowther 2009.
283 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland. [1993] A.C. 789.
284 Strunk v Strunk (1969).
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into the body of his brother, who is dying of a fatal kidney disease? We are of the 
opinion it does”.285
The case concerned an obscure application of the test and involved two brothers – Tommy, 28 
and Jerry, 27. Due to contraction of a fatal kidney disease, Tommy required a transplant. His 
younger brother Jerry deemed ‘incompetent’, and ‘handicapped’, was not considered to have 
the legal capacity to consent to being the donor for his brother’s transplant, but he was 
assessed as being a suitable match for this.   In using the substituted judgment standard, the 
case was put forward on Appeal that Jerry’s welfare revolved around the existence of his 
brother (a reminder of judgment in the later case of Re Y286) and that his love and dependence 
as such meant that he would have consented to the removal of his own kidney to this end, if he 
could have. This was weighed against the dissenting judges of the case. Steinfeld, J. dissenting, 
likened the process (of removal with substituted consent) on these grounds as being on the 
same debauched level as genocide and experimentation:
“My sympathies and emotions are torn between a compassion to aid an ailing young 
man and a duty to fully protect unfortunate members of society … I am unwilling to hold 
that the gates should be open to permit the removal of an organ from an incompetent 
for transplant, at least until such time as it is conclusively demonstrated that it will be of 
significant benefit to the incompetent”.287
The ‘benefit’ to Jerry is very difficult to reconcile. The use of the substituted judgment test in 
Strunk288 was in fact a misapplication of the overall interests test. This is based on the simple 
premise; how can it be deduced that a person would think and feel something now if he has 
285 Strunk v Strunk (1969) at para 1.
286 Re Y, 1997.
287 Ibid per Judge Steinfeld.
288 Strunk v Strunk (1969).
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neither thought nor felt it previously?  The standard of substituted judgment has been further 
extended since Strunk to include parental substituted judgment where the patient is a minor.289
As argued by Berghmans,290 the substituted judgment standard could never be applied 
to those with severe dementia due to the problem of conflicting interests between the person 
who was, and is now. Whilst this may be true in the later stages of dementia (i.e. L3-L4), until 
the personal identity problem applies, this would be a view inconsistent with the PGC as 
autonomy, and the purposes we pursue as ostensible agents, ought to be at the forefront of 
any proxy decision-making, and the best way to do this (where possible and where there is 
evidence) is through imagining what this person would have wanted now if they could make 
that decision. This should always be the case until the personal identity problem becomes a 
problem. Also guided by the PGC, there are other considerations to be made where competing 
interests overlap between persons which I will now discuss as an option where this is the 
(usually rare) case.
6.3 The Overall Interests Test291
Developed by Shaun Pattinson,292 the overall interests test requires a direct assessment of what 
is best for all of the main involved parties considering the interests of others. As set out by 
Pattinson, the overall interests test involves three main ways that one person’s interests may 
be overridden by another’s, (as warned by Pattinson, this test is not a Utilitarian model).293
First, the interests in question could be less worthy of protection, second, the participant could 
be worthy of lower protection and thirdly, the aggregated interests of others could outweigh 
the interests of the person in question. This test is a helpful aid when the conflicting rights of 
ostensible agents are to be accounted for, which is limited to applying only in certain 
289 See Stump v. Sparkman, (1978) (435 U.S. 349) Which saw a petition to sterilise an incompetent 
fifteen year old deemed ‘retarded’ which was approved without notice, without a formal judicial 
hearing, and without a guardian ad litem, using solely her mother's substituted judgment.
290 Berghmans, 1993.
291 Invented by Pattinson 2011, 399.
292 Ibid.
293 Ibid.
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circumstances. Such circumstances would be assessed on their own merit and an assessment 
would need to be made based upon the interference of rights relying on the ‘needs’ set out at 
1.5.1 i.e. the ‘additive’, ‘non-subtractive’ and ‘basic’ needs of persons.  Putting this into practice 
if we imagined a millionaire (without an appointed LPA) who is in a PVS where no prior wishes 
had been expressed and no advance refusal pertaining to this situation. The same millionaire 
has made out a will leaving his whole estate to his four motherless children: the children are 
left penniless during this time, leading to misery, starvation, illness and homelessness. The 
millionaire can never recover from his current state. From the PGC’s perspective, and applying 
the overall interests test, a careful balancing act must be executed where the rights of parties 
conflict. Here, the balancing is tipped in favour of preservation of the children’s rights and 
needs as the ‘personhood’ factor is not present for those in a PVS. However this is only 
accepted remembering that those in a PVS under the PGC need to be given ANH, but that such 
positive interference with the GR need not continue indefinitely (where inhumane or futile). 
This thought would be weighed to an extent against the needs of his family. Where the same 
category of ‘needs’ and correlating rights conflict an assessment would need to be made based 
upon the situation itself. 
Practically, the overall interests test is based upon what course of action is deemed to 
be in a person’s interests ‘all circumstances (including acting in the best interests of others) 
involved’. A vital reference to the overall interests test is made out in the MCA CoP where a 
decision made in best interests ‘might include the effect of the decision on other people, 
obligations to dependants or the duties of a responsible citizen’ (at 5.47). The MCA  CoP also 
allows for actions which benefit other people, as an example, allowing for extension of the best 
interests test to enforce the giving of blood samples from an incapacitated person, to test for 
genetic links to cancer in a family (to benefit another family member, at 5.48). It is yet to be 
seen how far this principle would stretch. So where the MCA CoP stresses here that ‘best 
interests goes beyond the person’s medical interests’, again, guidance must be given as to the 
limit and extent of this ad hoc licence to use what is tantamount to Pattinson’s overall interests 
test. The test in and of itself is in keeping with the PGC’s requirement that all agents (pursuant 
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to the UDHR) are to be treated with equal dignity and rights, as where rights conflict, this must 
be accounted for – but leaving this open could lead to Utilitarian abuse ringing true of the 
outcome in Re Y.294
6.4 Updating the MCA 2005: A New Model of Deciding What is Best
It is hoped that this chapter has demonstrated the benefits of a new model, based upon the 
PGC as an ethical foundation, for judging what is best for persons who cannot decide, or have 
not decided, this for themselves. The best interests test alone is not always adequate in 
achieving this. My suggestions for a new model for assessing what is best will now be laid 
down. I have also provided for how best to treat advance refusals when ambiguity is involved 
about their validity and applicability in what I call the ‘First Assessment’ which I start with as a 
reference point:
1) The First Assessment: this stage includes an assessment firstly of the moral status of 
a person (personhood). When person is classed as an ostensible agent, but cannot 
be viewed as having legal capacity, the second assessment applies;
2) The Second Assessment: does the person have task-specific competence? If they do, 
this must be taken into consideration to ensure the right to autonomy is elevated;  
3) The Third Assessment: this is an assessment to always be carried out unless the first 
assessment proves that the subject is not an ostensible agent. This stage requires
viewing whether or not the personal identity problem is a problem. If it is not a 
problem, any former wishes, values, views and beliefs of the former person should 
be applied, and the substituted judgment test should be the default position. The 
type of situation where this is appropriate would be in the circumstances outlined in 
Re M295 above at 4.2. If the personal identity problem is a problem;  
4) The Fourth Assessment applies if it is beyond all reasonable doubt that a person is 
no longer the same person, with radically different characteristics and a severe 
294 Re Y, 1997.
295Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287. 
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personality change. Under these conditions, the best interests test would apply. The 
caveat always with employing the best interests test is that we could not know what 
a person’s memories were, thus we could never be certain of the radical change 
assumed (hence the use of ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ as certainty is impossible); 
and,
5) The Fifth Assessment: a consideration of the rights of others by way of the ‘overall 
interests test’ is always to be considered when rights of persons (in the same ‘needs’ 
categories) conflict, remembering the universalisability stage in the PGC.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
The application of the main provisions of the MCA 2005 should reflect the spirit of the advance 
refusals sections and the best interests test. These provisions without doubt were nobly 
created at a time when they were needed, to enable the regulation of respect for an 
incapacitated person’s general wishes, values, views and beliefs. Unfortunately, lacking 
objectives and theoretical applicability have rendered the conferred rights virtually unused and 
unusable.
Whilst this thesis has argued for change, it is accepted that most people do not make an 
advance refusal of any kind, let alone advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment.  Various 
reasons are given for this; the most compelling is probably that people do not want to think 
about the worst, the inevitable, death.296
However, many people do have strong feelings about what they want to happen to 
them when they can no longer decide for themselves. As a trainee solicitor, I have noticed that 
the demand for the creation of LPAs for health and welfare is often driven by the donor’s 
(creator’s) desire to include their feelings about how events will play out regarding their end of 
life care. Most people describe conferring power on others regarding life-sustaining treatment 
as being much more satisfying than making a refusal themselves. This is generally felt on the 
basis that the attorney will be in a position to know more about modern medicine, treatment, 
and about what may be best, when the donor is unable to know these things. Such power is 
conferred to attorneys by way of the ‘tick the box’ exercise offered in this type of LPA297 which 
allows or disallows appointed attorneys to either make decisions about life-sustaining 
296 BBC, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/euthanasia/overview/livingwills.shtml <accessed 
11/11/2013>
297 There is also another kind of LPA, for financial matters.
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treatment or not. The LPA also allows for the donor to create ‘wishes’ regarding various issues 
(these wishes are not formally enforceable). These wishes could include donation of the body 
to science, through to who is allowed to be present at the donor’s hospital bed.  There are 
disadvantages of an LPA of this kind, mostly due to the non-enforceability of wishes included, 
and also because any advance decision made by the donor (on the same subject) can be 
overruled by the appointed attorneys through the LPA. This can be problematic if the attorney’s 
decision greatly conflicts with a person’s identity and former wishes, values, views and 
beliefs.298 The alternative of course is making an advance refusal in line with the MCA 2005; 
such a decision could prove more capable of ensuring the autonomous decisions of a person 
who once had capacity (after it is lost). Use of the LPA for health and welfare indicates that 
people are willing to think about the unthinkable, and to exercise autonomy in the face of its 
loss. Yet, the process for creating advance refusals can be onerous, confusing, and, after 
enduring and meeting all legislative requirements, they can be ignored or overridden all too 
easily. Building on this, even with legislative change, the main provisions for creation of 
advance refusals have a long way to go before they reach widespread implementation, if ever. 
Ways to address this deficit may be found in an online registration, general advertising, advice 
lines, GP driven schemes, registration cards and so on. The approach in California is highly 
accessible and user-friendly. The Californian Advance Health Care Directive (herein ‘CAHCD’) is 
a clear-cut, easy-to-use, easy-to-execute document that enables a person to make an array of 
decisions about current and future treatment including organ donation, consent to autopsy, 
and refusal of life-sustaining treatment. The CAHCD combines what we know to be an LPA of 
health and welfare with an advance refusal of any kind. An amalgamated document of this type 
would further empower donors, adding substance to the LPA we already have in England and 
Wales.
To date, thankfully, there has been little opportunity for the MCA 2005 to encounter 
many of the difficulties discussed in this thesis. Nevertheless, it is only a matter of time before 
lacking substance in the legislation results in yet more issues. Stark reminders of problems 
298 Sulmasy, D, et al 1998, 621-629.
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already encountered were shown in the haunting tales of patients alike M299 and E300 who were 
wrongfully treated in line with conferred ‘best interests’, and not forgetting The X Primary Care 
Trust v XB301 case where a man’s family had to fight for the preservation of his wishes due to a 
small error in the way an advance refusal was executed.302 The current state of the law on 
advance refusal needs to undergo change to evolve with the times. The main issues revolve 
around the lack of cohesion between the aims of the MCA 2005 which claim to offer extensive 
autonomy to persons beyond the here and now, and the actuality of the provisions which are 
curbed by the application of Article 2’s right to life. As discussed, there are a multitude of other 
problems with definition, interpretation and implementation – generally speaking many of the 
issues presented at common law preceding the act still exist today. 
This thesis has sought to draw attention to the fact that there are elements of the MCA 
2005 that do not address the distinct ethical challenges presented. Once these practical, social 
and ethical issues are addressed, the 2005 Act, if modified, could present itself as being an 
opportunity for people to reserve autonomy, to reserve the wishes, values, views and beliefs of 
persons as was first hoped by its introduction. 
An Act granting rights must also grant access to them, otherwise such rights are 
inadmissible. Any right conferred under any piece of legislation in England and Wales must be 
compliant with human rights and with the UDHR. Such access, therefore, must also coincide 
with the PGC due to synonymy (the dialectically contingent argument at 1.5.2). At the core of 
the PGC therein lies agency, and agency’s core is autonomy. Ignoring the notion of personhood 
is leading to inefficiency of the MCA 2005 as without addressing this key matter, the main 
provisions in relation to advance refusals, can never be meaningful. The danger of this has been 
shown in practice as even with the introduction of the Act and the concomitant Court of 
Protection, legislative regulation is still translated in a minefield of jumbled judicial decision.303
299 Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287.
300 A Local Authority v E; EWHC 1639 (COP); 2 F.C.R. 523, 2012.
301 The X Primary Care Trust v XB [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
302 The X Primary Care Trust v XB [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
303 Most recently (and notably) shown in cases such as Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287.
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Using the PGC would have a bearing on the consistency of how the MCA is applied in 
practice. It is hoped that this thesis has demonstrated the benefits of employing a succinct 
mechanism for determining the moral status of a being. Without determining the moral status 
of a person, one cannot determine how best to attribute rights; the rights grantable to a person 
in a PVS differ greatly to the rights grantable to those who have full capacity and consciousness.
Once moral status is determined, the problem of personal identity (where it is a 
problem) must be addressed. Using Pattinson’s model for task-specific competence means that 
autonomy is preserved in as far as possible, which the legal test for capacity does not allow for. 
Autonomy cannot be respected if it is not applicable – dementia, in many forms, invokes the 
personal identity problem. Whilst the PGC would not agree with the presupposition that 
persons change with every moment per Parfit, it is accepting that people can, and do, change. 
Regardless of the contributors, if a person’s personality severely changes, the PGC would not 
encourage that they are treated as the same person, this would apply with or without an 
advance refusal. Whist Dworkin advocated that any decision be made after consideration of the 
subject’s ‘critical’ and ‘experiential’ interests, as argued, these interests are somewhat 
irrelevant and leave the floodgates ajar for decision-making as any assessment would need to 
be made on the basis of the needs hierarchy outlined in the PGC. The personal identity problem 
needs to be accounted for in the MCA 2005, if it is not, the act will have a reverse effect to that 
which was hoped and anticipated. 
As I have argued in chapter five, the current ‘catch-all’ best interests test is unworthy of 
acclamation in the modern day, and has passed its sell-by date. In a modern age, people are 
demanding more respect for what they want, regardless of what judges, medical professionals, 
friends and other close links want them to want as shown in discussion of outcomes in the 
cases of A Local Authority v E304 and Re M.305 This thesis maintains that the starting point in 
assessing whether or not an advance decision applies (differing from validity and applicability) 
should be ‘does this person matter?’. This is for the reasons set out in chapter three, and is to 
be the building block for thought on whether or not an advance decision can apply. To ensure 
304 A Local Authority v E; EWHC 1639 (COP); 2 F.C.R. 523, 2012.
305Re M [2011] EWHC 1197 (Fam); 1 W.L.R. 287. 
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compliance with the PGC, and with human rights in general, such as upholding the rights to 
dignity, equality and autonomy, a new attitude must be taken towards advance decision-
making. With a more general application of the framework set out at 5.5, the suggested process 
for determining whether an advance refusal does or does not apply is as follows:
1) ‘does this person matter?’;
2) if the answer is ‘no’ then the person is not considered an ostensible agent under the 
PGC. If it is yes, we look to the next question;
3) ‘is the personal identity problem present?’ If the answer is no and the person does 
not have legal capacity but has a level of task-specific competence to that effect, an 
advance refusal should still be applicable based upon substituted judgment; but
4) if the answer to 3) is yes, then the best interests test is applicable (based upon his 
former wishes, values, views and beliefs); 
5) The overall interests test would always apply, if rights were conflicting. 
Ultimately, this thesis has tried to show that the advance refusals provisions, and the best 
interests test, amount colloquially, to being the 2005 Act’s Achilles’ heel. Critics’ concerns 
regarding the enactment as simply embedding the mistakes of common law have undeniably 
materialised.306 It is not news that legislative change is needed, indeed many more concerns 
have since arisen over the past eight years.307 Whilst the spirit of the Act may be supported in a 
new and updated version of the MCA CoP, this is not binding on those making decisions, be it 
in court or in hospitals. Because supporting provisions are not strong enough to knit the Act 
together, a new Mental Capacity Act is needed. The improved Act could do everything the MCA 
2005 set out to do, but in a more realistic fashion. A PGC-friendly version of the2005 Act, that is 
inclusive of key ethical considerations of personhood, personal identity issues, preserving 
autonomy in real terms, and preserving the wishes, values, views and beliefs of persons, could 
stand a fighting chance of achieving what it sets out to do. 
306 See Michalowski 2005, 958- 959.
307 At the time of writing; royal assent occurred 7 April 2005. 
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Without some degree of change in legislation and judicial decision it is argued that the 
main provisions for advance refusals may not gain the momentum needed to make a difference 
in practice, and advance refusals may become redundant. Generally speaking, the law in this 
area here in England and Wales is still producing volatile and unpredictable results.308
The question then follows, why do we have the provisions at all if we cannot inject the 
requisite considerations into legislation to make them ethically and practically viable? Unless 
the MCA 2005 is rethought in light of prominent ethical, legal and social considerations, the 
constraints on paper will continue to suppress the important underlying values promulgating 
individual autonomy. In 2004, Americans Fagerlin and Schneider gave up hope, declaring the 
failure of the living will and the exposition ‘It is time to say, ‘enough’’.309 Whilst it is time to say 
‘enough’ to the inertia which stultifies any improvement; for those of us wishing to avoid the 
Sirens, this is an area of law which we cannot disregard. 
308 Ibid ; [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) at 129 
309 Fagerlin & Schneider 2004. 
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